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ABSTRACT 
 
JOSEPH E. WILLIAMS (JED): Wired for the Future?:  
Creative Destruction and Continual Renewal of the Associated Press 
(Under the direction of Penny Muse Abernathy, Leroy Towns, and Heidi Hennink-Kaminski) 
 
 
For 164 years, the Associated Press has been a cornerstone of traditional news 
organizations, producing and distributing original and re-purposed reports from around the 
globe to thousands of subscribers.  Today, as “creative destruction” and secular change batter 
the media industry, forcing newspapers to re-evaluate their identity, AP’s once-timeless role 
as “the essential global news network” is now uncertain.  Using a case study approach, this 
paper examines historical usage trends of AP content in two North Carolina daily newspapers 
from 1985 through 2008, explores state news-sharing arrangements that have sprung forward 
as alternatives to AP, and subsequently maps attempts by the cooperative to reinvent itself as 
a sustainable enterprise.  Beholden to its longtime members yet aggressively re-imagining its 
business model, AP finds itself in a dilemma: can it innovate quickly enough and deliver a 
value proposition substantial enough to maintain an “essential” place in the rapidly-changing 
marketplace? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iv 
 
ACKNOWLEGMENTS 
 
First and foremost, I am indebted to my adviser, chair, and mentor Penny Muse 
Abernathy, from whom so many of the project’s ideas originated.  She motivated my work 
from the outset and relentlessly and enthusiastically championed the importance of the 
research all the way through to completion.    
Many thanks also go out to my thesis committee – Leroy Town and Heidi Hennink-
Kaminski – a committed and steadfastly supportive group that advanced the project in bold 
and exciting ways.  Special thanks to reader Christine Shia, who invested richly in this 
endeavor and helped to sharpen its message. 
So many faculty and staff in the School of Journalism and Mass Communication at 
UNC expressed great interest in this project, cultivated its ideas, and offered unyielding 
support during this 15-month journey.  Thanks to each and every person in Carroll Hall who 
embraced both this author and this initiative. 
Finally, the “buy-in” from the media industry was nothing short of astounding.  
Twenty-four different executives from the Associated Press and newspapers across the 
country lent their voices and insights to a project that aims to return useful information to 
them.  In particular, I thank Jim Kennedy (Vice President of Strategic Planning at AP), 
Charles Broadwell (President and Publisher at The Fayetteville Observer), and Rick Thames 
(Editor of the Charlotte Observer) for their commitment to this effort.    
  
v 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
          
I. CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION ………………………………………….    1 
 
A. Introductory Case Study ……………………………………………….. 4  
 
B. History/Literature Review ……………………………………………… 4 
 
1. Part I: Developing and Defining the Core Business ……………….. 4 
 
2. Part II: Protecting the Core from Competitive Threats …………….. 16
  
3. Part III: Reinventing the Core to Sustain and Survive ……………… 28 
 
C. Research Questions ……………………………………………………… 37 
 
D. Methods …………………………………………………………………. 38 
 
E. Limitations ………………………………………………………………. 41 
 
II. CHAPTER 2: BUILDING THE CORE BUSINESS: A CASE STUDY 
EXAMINATION OF TWO NORTH CAROLINA DAILY  
NEWSPAPERS’ HISTORICAL – AND CHANGING – USE OF  
THE ASSOCIATED PRESS ………………………………………………... 43 
 
A. Charlotte and Fayetteville: Wired Differently ……………………………  46 
 
B. “The Vanishing Newspaper” ……………………………………………... 47 
 
C. Going Local ………………………………………………………………. 49 
 
D. Analysis/Speculation/Conclusions ………………………………………..  53 
 
E. Tables …………………………………………………………………….. 56 
 
  
vi 
 
 
III. CHAPTER 3: SHARING TO SURVIVE: OHNO AND EMERGING  
INTERNAL THREATS TO AP’S CORE FOUNDATIONS ……………….. 60 
 
A. Part I: OHNO Sets the Precedent 
1. Biting the Hand That Always Fed ……………………………………. 61 
2. The Mechanics of Sharing ……………………………………………. 62 
3. OHNO Challenges, AP Responds ……………………………………. 64 
4. Shared Success ……………………………………………………….. 67 
5. The Bottom Line for OHNO …………………………………………. 68 
 
B. Part II: Sharing Becomes a Maine Priority ……………………………….. 70 
1. Maine and OHNO: Similar, but Not the Same ……………………….. 72 
2. Money to be Made? …………………………………………………… 73 
 
C. Part III: Coast to Coast Collaboration: The Emergence of McClatchy  
Regional News ……………………………………………………………. 74 
1. AP & McClatchy Regional News: Value Comparisons ……………… 75 
 
D. Part IV: Breaking Free or Holding On? …………………………………... 76 
1. AP’s Irresistible Value ………………………………………………… 77 
2. AP Reports, Members Decide ………………………………………… 80 
 
E. Part V: Conclusion ………………………………………………………… 84 
 
IV. CHAPTER 4: THE GATEWAY TO AP’S RE-IMAGINED  
BUSINESS MODEL …………………………………………………………. 85 
 
A. Seeing the Future ………………………………………………………….. 85 
 
B. From Surfing to Searching to the “Splinternet” ………………………….. 87 
 
C. Planting the Seeds of Change …………………………………………….. 89 
 
D. Tracking Use and Cracking Down on Misuse: Building a  
News Registry ……………………………………………………………. 91 
 
E. “Going Mobile” …………………………………………………………... 94 
 
F. Opening Up a Gateway to the Portable, Digital Frontier ………………… 98 
vii 
 
 
G. Putting It All Together …………………………………………………… 104 
 
V. CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION ………………………………………………. 106 
 
VI. APPENDICES ……………………………………………………………….. 109 
 
A. Appendix A: Fayetteville’s Associated Press Usage Patterns,                           
1985-2008…………………………………………………………………. 109 
 
B. Appendix B: Charlotte’s Associated Press Usage Patterns,                               
1985-2008 …………………………………………………………………. 112 
 
C. Appendix C: Internet/”Splinternet” Platform Characteristics Chart ……… 116 
D. Appendix D: “Web 2.0 Business Model” ………………………………… 117 
 
VII. SOURCES ……………………………………………………………………. 118 
 
A. Bibliography ………………………………………………………………. 118 
 
B. Web Sites and Online Resources ………………………………………….. 123 
 
C. Interviews …………………………………………………………………. 123
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER 1 
 
Introduction 
 Mark Twain once proclaimed: “there are only two forces that can carry light to all 
corners of the globe, only two – the sun in the heavens and the Associated Press down here.”1  
Mahatma Gandhi declared: “I suppose when I go to the Hereafter and stand at the Golden 
Gate, the first person I shall meet will be a correspondent of the Associated Press.”2   
 Such has been the scope and influence of America’s foremost news wire, which for 
164 years has pioneered news coverage, aggregation and distribution from coast to coast and 
beyond.  Before The New York Times and The Wall Street Journal filled newsstands, there 
was the Associated Press.  Long before radio and television signals first flickered, the AP 
stood supreme.  Light years ahead of the advent of USA Today, Politico.com or The 
Huffington Post, the AP set the standard.  Spanning three centuries as an agenda setter for 
national and international discourse, it is an institution.  Its towering reign, however, is in 
peril.  The reasons are both secular and cyclical.   
 The AP’s long, winding history of combating competitors and defending its market 
position falls into two distinct categories: stable business strategy and radical reform that 
embraces “creative destruction”3 - the process of transformation that accompanies radical 
                                                          
1
 Mears, Walter.  Breaking News; How The Associated Press Has Covered War, Peace, and Everything Else.  
New York, NY: Princeton Architectural Press, 2007: 403.  
2
 Matloff, Judith.  “Can the AP Go Global?”  Columbia Journalism Review.  May-June 2004: 16. 
3
 Foster, Richard and Sarah Kaplan.  Creative Destruction: Why Companies That Are Built to Last Underperform 
the Market – and How to Successfully Transform Them.  New York, NY: Currency Doubleday, 2001. 
2 
 
innovation.  Both are backed by economists and scholars who defend their merits.   Today, 
the AP must fend off a wave of attackers, from Internet search portals to local blogs, which 
are vast in number and continually evolving. It must choose the prudent course for its own 
survival, while convincing its partners and the 19 members of its executive board (composed 
principally of newspaper executives)4 to adopt the new technology and business model that it 
has embraced.  Emboldened by lowered barriers to entry, unencumbered by legacy costs and 
buoyed by their own technological breakthroughs – namely the dissolution of geographic 
monopolies through digital distribution platforms – new players threaten to undercut the 
AP’s differentiated advantage: global coverage that only its reporters can provide and re-
purposed local content that only its members will share, all distributed across a cooperative 
wire that only it can operate.   
 The AP also sees its market position jeopardized as disruptive change batters the 
media at large, crippling once-dominant industry leaders.  Formerly monopolistic newspapers 
are scaling back.  Some are shuttering entirely.  Local radio and television stations confront a 
similar fate.  What many pegged as just another transient trend appears to be a revolution: 
media is digitizing, becoming increasingly user-interactive and user-generated, and going 
both social and viral.  As it does, it disintermediates the resource and platform advantages 
that long allowed the old guard to stand apart.  Secular changes in the industry are 
compounded by a severe cyclical downturn, which has shrunk profitable advertising streams 
that paid for the AP membership freight for mid-sized and large metro papers.   
 As a member-owned cooperative, the AP draws heavily from its constituents – these 
same struggling media companies – as its lifeblood, namely to fund the $500 million required 
                                                          
4
 “AP Board of Directors.”  See http://www.ap.org/pages/about/board.html.  
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to sustain its global news fleet of 3,000 journalists and editors.5  As they hemorrhage, the AP 
bleeds, too.  And as they struggle to survive, these local outlets are forced to consider 
alternative news suppliers.  Digital aggregators, supplemental wires and multimedia 
platforms are all jousting to wrest away the AP’s clientele.  In some cases, spurred by 
philosophical disagreements and cost concerns with the cooperative, existing members have 
created their own substitutes.   
 Judith Matloff, quoting a member of the wire, writes that the AP is “like a mother.  
She’s reliable.  She’s always there for you.  She’s easy to take for granted.  But you need 
her.”6  Do its constituents agree?  This paper analyzes the evolving relevance and value of 
the AP to its members and to the global media industry, as well as its response to the “gales 
of destruction,” an expression first coined by Austrian economist Joseph Schumpeter to 
describe seismic business and structural industry change.7  It employs a case study method to 
examine three fundamental business principles at play in the AP during an era of disruptive 
change: defining and developing the core business, identifying core threats from peripheral 
challengers, and re-inventing the core – both competencies and constituents – to combat 
competitors and ensure sustainability.  The first case samples two North Carolina daily 
newspapers – the Charlotte Observer and The Fayetteville Observer.  As larger circulation 
dailies paying a higher annual membership than the average news organization, they 
represent the company’s “bread and butter.”  The second case explores statewide and 
regional news-sharing alliances, notably the Ohio News Organization, formed to diminish 
local newspapers’ dependence on AP.  The final case studies how the AP is attempting to re-
                                                          
5
 Kennedy, Jim.  “Newsgathering.”  Message to Jed Williams.  E-mail.  25 Feb. 2010. 
6
 Foster and Kaplan, supra note 3, at 17. 
7
 Schumpeter, Joseph A.  Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy.  New York, NY: Harper, 1942.   
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imagine its business model to counteract threats and survive in the rapidly-changing 
marketplace.  
 Ultimately, the company must confront a more prevailing question: in a 
disintermediated, digital age, rife with competition from both aggregators and disaggregators, 
is there a need for a global news wire?  How the AP frames its response will go a long way in 
providing the answer.     
I. Introductory Case Study 
To contextualize the challenges facing the AP, review the multimedia case study linked 
below, including a video interview with CEO Tom Curley: 
http://www.unc.edu/~jedw/ap/ 
II. History/Literature Review 
Part I – Building the Core Business 
 The advent of the telegraph fueled the explosive growth of nineteenth century 
American newspapers, and subsequently, the emergence of wire services such as the 
Associated Press.  Dating back to colonial America, newspapers held considerable local clout 
but were encumbered by geographical limitations on their circulation.  In one technological 
boom, however, the telegraph changed that, giving editors “the opportunity to bring news 
into the community ahead of transportation systems.”8  Historians Jean Folkerts, Dwight 
                                                          
8
 Cook, Phillip, Douglas Gomery and Lawrence Lichty.  The Future of News: Television-Newspapers-Wire 
Services-News Magazines.  Washington, D.C.: The Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1992: 146. 
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Teeter and Ed Caudill note that “the telegraph accelerated press cooperation.”9  In 1846, New 
York Sun proprietor Moses Yale Beach coalesced six New York newspapers to share reports.  
Soon after, The New York Times joined.10  The AP was born.   
 The initial arrangement was newspaper-exclusive.  Radio and television were still 
decades from invention, while magazines were not mainstream until the early twentieth 
century.11  The new initiative galvanized contentious rivals around the idea of sharing, rather 
than outdueling, to augment their newsgathering and thus extend both their reach and 
influence.  Walter Mears contextualizes this as a radical departure for “the belligerent New 
York press.  Newspapers competed aggressively, sometimes violently, to be the first with 
news.  The telegraph revolutionized the race.”12  These northeastern metro dailies soon 
agreed to “broaden their cooperation to include the gathering of news from all over the 
United States,” but they consolidated all power among the original core.13  Not until Daniel 
Craig took the reins in 1851 did the AP implement the business model that guides the 
cooperative even today.  The AP’s pioneers originally crafted it for newsgathering purposes.  
Craig boldly redefined the service as a “news vendor.  The AP would sell its news to out-of-
town newspapers to defray costs and ask those papers to contribute news to the 
association.”14  The modern blueprint took shape.   
 The AP’s fundamental business architecture – born of a clear mission and a 
concentrated constituent base – mirrored business strategist Chris Zook’s insistence on “the 
                                                          
9
 Folkerts, Jean, Edward Caudill, and Dwight L. Teeter, Jr.  Voices of a Nation: A History of Mass media in the 
United States.  Boston: Pearson, 2009: 136. 
10
 Mears, supra note 1, at 403-404. 
11
 McCombs, Maxwell, Donald L. Shaw and David Weaver.  Communication and Democracy: Exploring the 
Intellectual Frontiers in Agenda-Setting Theory.   Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc., 1997: 216. 
12
 Mears, supra note 1, at 403. 
13
 Id. at 404. 
14
 Id. at 405. 
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extraordinary importance of creating a strong core business as a foundation for driving 
company growth.”15  This “profitable core” should gather around well-defined audience 
segments and delineate clear “business boundaries,” allowing the business to emerge as an 
industry leader in those focused areas rather than chase wild growth across multiple fronts.16  
At the heart of this decision, a company must adopt a “clear point of view.”17  Absent that 
clarity of purpose, “it is difficult to determine the competitive position, the relative 
importance of differently positioned competitors, or the relative strategic importance of 
different growth opportunities.”18  Craig’s bold direction for the nascent cooperative 
resembled the guide for building a strategic roadmap that Robert Kaplan and David Norton 
sketch in “The Balanced Scorecard.”19  Their process for “translating a mission into desired 
outcomes” begins with a precise mission – “why we exist” – and vision – “what we want to 
be” – before tactics are ever implemented.20  This is akin to Jim Collins’ “Hedgehog 
Principle” – the “crystalline concept” that drives the essence of the business.21   
 Craig left no room for doubt: the AP existed for its newspaper owners not only to 
amass the news, but to sell it.  It would scale this idea to newspapers beyond the northeast to 
assemble a wire cooperative of unmatched reach and influence.  Its “strategy map” quickly 
                                                          
15
 Zook, Chris.  Profit from the Core: Growth Strategy in an Era of Turbulence.  Boston, MA: Harvard Business 
School Press, 2001: 17.          
16
 Id. at 35. 
17
 Id. 
18
 Id. 
19
 Kaplan, Robert and David Norton.  The Strategy-Focused Organization: How Balanced Scorecard Companies 
Thrive in the New Business Environment.  Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 2001. 
20
 Id. at 73.  
21
 Collins, Jim.  Good to Great: Why Some Companies Make the Leap…and Others Don’t.  New York, NY: 
HarperCollins, 2001: 96.  “The ‘Hedgehog Principle’…flows from the from deep understanding about the 
intersection of the following three [concentric circles]: 1) What you can be the best in the world at; 2) What 
drives your economic engine; and 3) What you are deeply passionate about.” 
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jumped from the “back of a napkin” to the heart of newsrooms across the country.22  
Regional alliances soon formed in New England and to the south and west.  All decision-
making and pricing power remained bundled in New York, though, prompting outside 
publishers to bemoan lean news rations and exorbitant costs.23  The New York nucleus was 
highly protective of its members and restrictive of who could join.24  As Mears highlights, 
“the issues of exclusive services, franchises, restrictive rules on newspaper membership and 
conduct…led to the creation of the AP’s 20th century wire service competitors (see Part II: 
15-16).”25  The AP’s weighty membership restrictions were finally struck down by the 
Supreme Court in 1945.26  The edict shook the company’s traditional core, but as Mears 
argues, for the better.  “It was a defeat the Associated Press sorely needed.  Bound by the 
strictures on serving rival newspapers, the service could not have expanded.”27 
 Just over a half-century old by the early twentieth century, the AP already operated its 
core business under the “assumption of continuity” that economists Richard Foster and Sarah 
Kaplan caution against.28  Exclusive service agreements and stringent membership rules 
reinforced the company’s “mental model,” composed of those principles that fostered its 
success to that point.  Rooted in member loyalty, and in return, fierce defense of core 
                                                          
22
 Kaplan and Norton, supra note 19, at 97. 
23
 Folkerts, Caudill and Teeter, supra note 9, at 138. 
24
 Mears, supra note 1, at 406.  Once enrolled, newspapers were prohibited from publicly criticizing the AP. 
25
 Id. at 408. 
26
 Associated Press v. United States.  326 U.S. 1 (1945).  Justice Black delivered the Court’s opinion that the 
“inability to buy news from the largest news agency or any one of its multitude of members can have most 
serious effects on the publication of competitive newspapers, both those presently published and those 
which, but for these restrictions, might be published in the future” (13).  As a result, the Court “adjudged the 
bylaws imposing restrictions on applications for membership to be illegal [and] enjoined the defendants from 
observing them, or agreeing to observe any new or amended bylaw having a like purpose or effect” (21). 
27
 Mears, supra note 1, at 411. 
28
 Foster and Kaplan, supra note 3, at 10.                          
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constituents, the model was designed “to ensure predictable goal achievement.”29  These 
authors suggest that the derivative of this assumptive line of thinking is “cultural lock-in – a 
state in which the corporation is effectively frozen in place.”30  When this occurs, managers 
can struggle to identify the challenges endemic to their life cycle stage and the strategies that 
befit it.31  Above, Mears states that the AP’s rigid mental model thwarted growth.32  Clayton 
Christensen pegs this as a malady afflicting many maturing businesses as “large companies 
adopt a strategy of waiting until new markets are ‘large enough to be interesting’ before 
entering.33  By doing so, they miss out on the opportunity to tap into soaring ventures at the 
pinnacle of their growth.  Applying Foster and Kaplan, the sprawling behemoth lumbered 
behind a shield of operational continuity that undermined its ability to “innovate at the pace 
and scale of the market.”  Focused on the need “to control existing operations,”34 such 
“companies resist doing anything to jeopardize their relationships with customers.”35 
 Even in the face of its own rigidity, the AP confronted little adversity until radio and 
television debuted.  From 1914 to 1940, the cooperative blossomed, expanding its newspaper 
clientele by 1300 percent, from 100 to 1400 members.36  For hometown publishers, it offered 
unprecedented advantages, “making it possible for a small-town paper to publish a story from 
                                                          
29
 Id. at 18. 
30
 Id. at 79. 
31
 Armstrong, Gary and Philip Kotler.  Marketing, An Introduction.  Ninth Edition.  Upper Saddle River, NJ: 
Pearson Prentice Hall, 2009: 247. 
32
 Mears, supra note 1, at 411. 
33
 Christensen, Clayton.  The Innovator’s Dilemma.  New York, NY: HarperCollins Publishers, 1997: xxiv. 
34
 Kaplan and Norton, supra note 19, at 15. 
35
 Foster and Kaplan, supra note 3, at 85.  The authors call on corporations to “recognize and embrace the 
prospect of discontinuity.”  Capital markets that by their very nature are discontinuous cannot be matched or 
outperformed by companies until they relinquish their operational habits.  The authors suggest that this 
requires a willingness to destroy in order to create that spawns only from “divergent thinking” (22). 
36
 Marzio, Peter C.  The Men and Machines of American Journalism.  Washington, D.C.: The National Museum 
of History and Technology, The Smithsonian Institution: 115. 
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Europe or Asia as quickly as The New York Times or the Chicago Tribune.”37  As such, it 
became “indispensable…for a local editor striving to produce a complete and credible 
newspaper.”38   
 The value proposition that AP delivered to its newspaper core was robust enough to 
allow it to regularly increase member assessments because “publishers would rather pay for 
AP than switch.”39  However, these member assessment hikes were actually a form of price 
setting, not strategic pricing, as distinguished by Thomas Nagle.40  While the vast value that 
the AP bundled to subscribers enabled it to increase prices as it deemed necessary, market 
changes often forced the company’s hand because it could not escape “cost[s] of new 
technology” necessary to stay current41  This follows Foster and Kaplan’s aforementioned 
principle requiring firms to keep pace with the movement of the macro market or tumble into 
an “inevitable slide into mediocrity.”42  Ironically, Christensen suggests that the very entity – 
customers – that first powers a company later weakens it.43  He terms this “resource 
dependence,”44 arguing that companies’ “freedom of action is limited to satisfying the needs 
of those entities outside the firm that give it the resources it needs to survive.”45  In the AP’s 
case, those outside entities were its longstanding newspaper partners, who mutually owned 
the cooperative and authored its initiatives to reflect their needs and values.   
                                                          
37
 Id. 
38
 Cook, Gomery and Lichty, supra note 8, at 148. 
39
 Id. at 152. 
40
 Nagle, Thomas.  The Strategy and Tactics of Pricing.  Third Edition.  Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 
2002: 1.  In price setting, a company reacts to current market forces, while in strategic pricing, it “proactively 
manag[es] them.”    
41
 Cook, Gomery and Lichty, supra note 8, at 151. 
42
 Foster and Kaplan, supra note 3, at 60. 
43
 Christensen, supra note 33, at 117. 
44
 Id.  
45
 Id. 
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 By the 1920s, the AP began exploring adjacencies to its core business, but never at 
the risk of weakening its bond with newspapers. AP Radio launched in 1920, yet no wire 
service copy was offered to emerging radio networks (see Part II: 19-20).46  Meanwhile, local 
broadcasters were not granted membership status in the cooperative until 1947, more than a 
quarter-century after the AP first entered the radio market.47  Even then, as “radio news over 
the wire became an integral part of every AP bureau,”48 broadcast outlets were considered 
“associate members” as opposed to “regular members” – a badge reserved for daily 
newspapers.  This membership structure holds true today, with non-daily newspapers also 
considered “associate members.”49  The AP finally expanded into television in 1994, more 
than three decades after the medium achieved mainstream saturation, with the launch of its 
international television division, AP Television News (APTN). 
 The AP’s gradual move into surrounding mediums equates with Zook’s evaluation of 
adjacency expansion opportunities.  In marketing parlance, these adjacencies represent brand 
extensions, which transpose “a current brand name to new or modified products in a new 
category.”50  He encourages businesses to consider adjacency expansions only if the moves 
are into related segments “that utilize and…reinforce the strength of the profitable core.”51  
Collins calls this the “single denominator” concept: that maximizing the growth and 
                                                          
46
 Folkerts, Caudill and Teeter, supra note 9, at 368.  Tension between the cooperative and the networks 
manifested itself in a full-fledged “press-radio war by the early 1930s.” 
47
 Mears, supra note 1, at 411. 
48
 Id. at 412. 
49
 “Consolidated Financial Statements: The Associated Press and Subsidiaries, Years ended December 31, 2008 
and 2007.”  <http://www.ap.org/annual09/media/APFinancials08.pdf>. 
50
 Armstrong, and Kotler, supra note 31, at 218.  “A brand extension gives a new product instant recognition 
and faster acceptance.”   
51
 Zook, supra note 15, at 62.  Adjacencies can be promising drivers of growth, but only in so far as they draw 
on “the core business to build competitive advantage in a new, adjacent competitive arena.”  Zook also argues 
that businesses must ask two principle questions when considering adjacency expansion: “how much does this 
strengthen our core business franchise?” and “does this investment position our core business strategically for 
an even stronger future adjacency?” (92).  
11 
 
profitability of a solitary business unit “tends to produce better insight than letting yourself 
off the hook with three or four denominators.”52  Kaplan and Norton, citing economist 
Michael Porter, see this as a systematic process in which each activity “reinforces the 
others.”53  Here, those activities stem from and then solidify the defined business core, which 
fosters the value proposition and thus the strategy map.54   
 Whereas the aforementioned scholars see Zook’s adjacency expansion as measured 
growth, others argue that it has a stunting effect.  The commitment to a concentrated core that 
Collins and Zook defend, Foster and Kaplan caution against, stressing that “loyalty to a 
flawed model can be costly.”55  A guarded approach to growth enfranchises new entrants, 
who can quickly overtake the incumbent’s position in the market.56  According to 
Christensen, “established firms tend to be good at improving what they have long been good 
at doing.”57  In doing so, they ignore or fail to even identify emerging markets, where he 
suggests the greatest future windfall lies.58   
 The AP has long chased the proper balance between core innovation and 
diversification that economists have debated for seemingly just as long.  True to his core 
commitment, Zook forecasts the dangers of overdiversification in what he calls “the 
Alexander problem,” named for Alexander the Great’s insatiable hunger to conquer 
territories.59  Consequently, his conquests lacked “lasting value.”60  Corporations suffer a 
                                                          
52
 Collins, supra note 21, at 104-105. 
53
 Kaplan & Norton, supra note 19, at 75. 
54
 Id. at 97. 
55
 Foster & Kaplan, supra note 3, at 69. 
56
 Id. at 47. 
57
 Christensen, supra note 33, at 35. 
58
 Id. at 146.  “Firms that sought growth by entering small, emerging markets logged 20 times the revenues of 
the firms pursuing growth in larger markets.” 
59
 Zook, supra note 15, at 61. 
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similar fate when adjacency expansion fails to “anchor in the core business.”61  Marketing 
scholars Gary Armstrong and Philip Kotler point out that such adjacencies, or extensions, 
“may confuse the image of the main brand.”62  Collins proposes that this inability to stick to a 
firm strategy often means making too many choices, consistent with his aforementioned 
“single denominator” theory.63  By contrast, Colin Hoskins, Stuart McFadyen and Adam 
Finn promote the advantages of diversification through “the portfolio effect.”  They predict 
reduced risk for those businesses benefiting from “the diversifying effect associated with 
increased numbers of firms, stocks, or whatever the asset is.”64  Christensen implies that this 
means having the verve to venture into new markets, even when success is not guaranteed 
and short-term struggle is likely.65   
 Now, 164 years after acting as the first mover into the wire industry, the AP finds 
itself as the disintermediated rather than the disintermediator.  This shift signifies a sharp turn 
in the wheel of retailing, which explains that “eventually, the new retailers become like the 
conventional retailers they replaced.”66  The rotations of the wheel are part of a retailer’s, or 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
60
 Id. 
61
 Id.  Strong cores are diluted “by virtue of premature abandonment, miscalculation, or overreaching in 
search of new growth.”  
62
 Armstrong and Kotler, supra note 31, at 218.  “If a brand extension fails, it may harm consumer attitudes 
toward the other products carrying the same brand name.” 
63
 Collins, supra note 21, at 104-105. 
64
 Hoskins, Colin, Stuart McFadyen and Adam Finn.  Media Economics: Applying Economics to New and 
Traditional Media.  Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2004: 134. 
65
 Christensen, supra note 33, at xviii. 
66
 Armstrong and Kotler, supra note 31, at 336.  According to the wheel-of-retailing concept, “many new types 
of retailing forms begin as low-margin, low-price, low-status operations.  They challenge established retailers 
that have become ‘fat’ by letting their costs and margins increase….The new retailers’ success leads them to 
upgrade their facilities and offer more services.  In turn, their costs increase, forcing them to increase their 
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product’s, life cycle, spanning four stages: introduction, growth, maturity and decline.67    
With the AP descending toward decline, afflicted by lowering profits and lagging customers, 
an array of emerging competitors nip at the heels of the cooperative in hopes of displacing 
it.68  These forces challenge the AP’s long-held monopoly as “the essential global news 
network,” requiring it to consider radical changes to its core business blueprint in order to 
generate substantial value for its sputtering partners to bump it out of “decline” and back into 
“maturity.”   
 Its response, true to its history of counteracting secular destruction of its own business 
and that of its members, has been mixed.  On the one hand, it continues to move into new 
adjacencies and diversify into completely new realms.  Whereas historically the AP only 
shared content with its traditional members, in 1998 it struck a paid-content sharing 
partnership with Internet portal Yahoo!.69  In 2006, current CEO Tom Curley inked an 
agreement with Google that licensed the leading line online search provider to carry wire 
stories and pictures within its Google News service (see Part II: 25).70  The AP has opened 
new regional bureaus while shuttering others in an effort to streamline workflow.  It has also 
released new products and services to better compete in the digital marketplace (see Part III: 
31-32).  The effects of this discontinuous line of thinking are more diverse constituents and 
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new revenue streams.  Associate members now outnumber daily newspapers by a multiple 
exceeding three.71  Profits from newspapers, representing more than half of the revenue pie in 
the mid-1980s, now carve just a 27 percent sliver – still the largest sector, but dramatically 
declining.72   
 Even as the cooperative re-imagines its core competencies and constituents, though, it 
continues to vigorously protect its legacy assets – the newspaper members whose 
relationships with the cooperative span generations.  Newspapers retain full ownership of the 
cooperative, which has never been publicly traded or beholden to creditors, shareholders or 
private equity.  Its Board mirrors this power construct.  Of the 19 seats, 18 are filled by 
newspaper executives,73 highlighted by the Board’s Director – MediaNews Group, Inc. 
Chairman William Dean Singleton.74  Curley stresses that “the most important thing is to 
understand the core cultural success foundation and not only preserve it, but worship it to 
make sure that the Holy Grail is not messed with by anybody.”75   
 What the AP must avoid, says Porter, is an uneven strategy that gets “stuck in the 
middle (see also Part II: 22).”76  This turbulence, reflected by either an inability to launch 
necessary adjacency expansions or an over-exuberance to diversify, comes to roost in a 
firm’s “unwillingness to make choices about how to compete.”77  Rather than sustain 
institutional momentum by cultivating enduring value from a well-delineated mission, these 
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firms instead slip into Collins’ “doom loop.”78  They lack the balanced strategy map that 
Kaplan and Norton stress as essential to any business.79  Christensen, however, distinguishes 
doomed thinking from divergent thinking.  Just because a new invention or business sector 
fails to offer instant rewards does not necessarily condemn it as desultory .  The challenge 
lies in ensuring that the “innovation - the disruptive technology that doesn’t make sense – is 
taken seriously within the company.”80  
 Moving forward, the AP confronts hard questions about its ideas of core and 
constituents, about its definition of what it is and what it aspires to be.  Matloff worries about 
the agility of the sprawling cooperative to re-position itself with the necessary efficiency to 
remain viable in the marketplace and valuable to its clientele.81  While its newspaper partners 
are shackled with cumbersome legacy costs such as printing presses and door-to-door 
distribution, the AP is constrained by a different, more intangible legacy effect: it “finds 
change difficult, in part because it can never be free of the needs of its members.”82  This 
weighty responsibility has affected how the AP identifies and responds to competitive threats 
as well as how it approaches technological and business innovation.  It has rendered the 
once-impregnable industry giant introspective of what exactly the proper response is…and if 
that response can ever again deliver value substantial enough to protect the stakeholders that 
have depended on it.      
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Part II: Protecting the Core from Competitive Threats 
 Formerly, in a media marketplace less stratified than present, the AP did not confront 
its first substantial competitive conflict until its twentieth year in existence.  That threat 
bubbled up from within its own ranks.  Regional AP alliances quickly grew agitated with 
cooperative’s power structure, decrying that the New York papers “overcharged local papers 
and dictated what news would be in the daily reports.”83  By 1866, irritation fomented into a 
full-fledged uprising over what Chicago Tribune Publisher Joseph Medill bemoaned as the 
AP’s “monopoly in the worst sense of the word.”84  Mears describes the Illinois-based 
Western AP bureau as being “in open rebellion.”85  The two factions ended the quarrel the 
next year by striking an agreement that respected each service’s territorial rights.86  It was 
more compromise than full resolution, though, as the two bureaus continued to operate 
separately until their merger in 1892.  This marked one of the few instances that the AP, 
often noted for its territoriality, responded quickly and effectively to subdue a conflict.   
 The first signs of the AP’s inaction in combating competitors surfaced in 1882.  In 
response to the AP’s hierarchical structure, the United Press formed to serve those 
newspapers that were barred from receiving AP reports.87  This marked the first external 
threat from a rival news agency of any kind.  The budding AP monopoly, largely 
unchallenged since its inception in 1848, reacted with a “complacency that could lead to 
stodginess.88  Though the AP succeeded in “pushing UP toward failure” (it declared 
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bankruptcy in 1897),89 it failed to address its infrastructure or heavy-handedness.  Rather, the 
local publishers of the AP of Illinois (the post-merger name adopted by the cooperative) 
simply pooled their money together in an aggressive campaign to outspend the UP for new 
contracts.  The restrictive rules that angered current members and excluded potential new 
ones remained untouched, leaving an opening for future competitors to step through.  
 Collins would attribute the AP’s sluggish, stubborn response to its publishers’ 
inability to complete both ends of the “Stockdale paradox.”90  This principle argues that 
sound business managers in the throes of conflict must “maintain unwavering faith that you 
can and will prevail in the end, regardless of the difficulties, and at the same time have the 
discipline to confront the most brutal facts of your current reality, whatever they might be.”91  
It must not hesitate, as Zook articulates, to ask defining business questions.92  Kaplan and 
Norton stress that Stockdale-esque conviction emanates not only from confidence in the 
overarching strategy, but also intricate knowledge of the strategy itself and how it may be 
challenged.93  While the AP embodied the first ideal Stockdale tenet with unfaltering resolve, 
it suffered from a skewed view of the second that enabled new wire services to serve the 
unmet needs of newspapers that the AP never embraced.  Collins believes that firms must be 
“relentlessly disciplined” in objectively sizing up the internal and external challenges they 
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face.94  Instead, through its domineering leadership and foundational arrogance, the AP fell 
into operational contentment.   
 Foster and Kaplan take a different slant.  They would assert that the company 
engaged in “incremental” innovation, or change, rather than “substantial” or 
“transformative.”95  Even though the AP ultimately survived its attacker, it underwent only 
incremental advancement by holding to its hard-and-fast rules.  As a result, it sacrificed the 
potentially prodigious rewards that come with embarking on a more ambitious change 
initiative.96  Christensen again blames customers – in this case the newspapers comprising 
the cooperative – for wielding negative influence over the larger company by leading “their 
suppliers toward sustaining innovations and…provid[ing] no leadership in instances of 
disruptive change.”97 
 New instances of disruptive change arose in 1907 and 1909, when newspaper moguls 
E.W. Scripps and William Randolph Hearst assembled their own wires to vie with the AP.  
Scripps reincarnated the UP, while Hearst branded his service the International News Service 
(INS).98  Rather than acknowledge the danger presented by these threats, the AP instead 
initially reacted with “annoyance.”99  Peter Marzio notes that the AP’s attitude allowed the 
UP in particular, and later the UPI (a merger of the UP and INS), to “blossom.”100  Two 
cardinal events triggered the AP’s awakening from its malaise and more apt response to these 
legitimate competitors.  First, under the leadership of Kent Cooper, who succeeded Melville 
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Stone as General Manager in 1925, the cooperative commenced a series of technological 
advances that strengthened its differentiation advantage by revolutionizing existing systems 
and pioneering new markets (see Part III: 29).  Second, the 1945 Supreme Court decision that 
forced the AP to drop its inflexible membership requirements breathed new energy into the 
cooperative (see Part I: page 7/footnote 26).101  These pivot points steered the AP toward 
renewed dominance, and by the 1970s sent UPI “sinking toward feared extinction.”102  
 While Christensen would define new entrants such as the UP, INS and later the UPI 
as attackers, and thus threats to the AP’s heretofore unimpeded monopoly, Porter suggests 
that they may have in fact been “good competitors.”103  He elaborates by defining a good 
competitor as “one that challenges the firm not to be complacent but is a competitor with 
which the firm can achieve a stable and profitable industry equilibrium.”104  While competing 
wires waged legitimate battle with the AP, the incumbent never relinquished its squeeze on 
the newspaper market.  Cooper approached their presence opportunistically by using them to 
“enhance [the] firm’s ability to differentiate itself by serving as a standard of comparison.”105  
 Though the AP frustrated current and prospective members alike with its rigid 
practices, its “reputation as a…reliable wire” – a key differentiation advantage – helped to 
overcome this hindrance.106  This netted early-mover advantages.107  These included buyer 
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switching costs, defined as the costs consumers incur when they change suppliers.108  If 
competing products fail to deliver a greater value proposition for buyers, then odds are they 
will stick with the original.  UPI never escaped its perception as “a number two service to 
AP.”109  The AP’s rebuff of competing wire services in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century also coincided with a period of press dominance and limited technological 
disruption in the media industry.  That would soon change.   
 The first challenge from one of Porter’s “bad competitors” (see footnote 94) arrived 
with the explosive growth of radio as a “worldwide force” by 1930.110  While the AP first 
introduced its own radio services in 1920, it blackballed emerging radio news networks such 
as CBS and NBC by “prohibiting networks from obtaining wire service copy.”111  This 
decision held many deleterious effects for the wire and its members.  Rather than shrink from 
the resistance, news departments at CBS and NBC instead expanded.112  Meanwhile, the AP 
swung the door wide for domestic and international competitors to enter.  The UP and INS 
both sold news reports to broadcasters.113  Transradio Press offered news to networks from 
Havas wire agency in France and Reuters in England.  Faced with the prospect of relenting, 
the AP instead bowed its neck.  It passed a formal resolution in 1933 that specifically forbade 
its members from selling news to the networks and even encouraged UP and INS members to 
follow its lead.  Only when the force of the combined competition threatened AP’s market 
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position did it finally back off and agree to provide radio service, “despite publishers’ 
opposition.”114   
 The AP’s publishers presided over this conflict with an intransigence that 
underscored Christensen’s theory of resource dependence.  The demands of its newspaper 
base rendered it incapable of entering emerging markets…or even spotting them.115  Its 
immobility sprung from the initial mental model that it still clung to (see Part I: 7).  By this 
point, the early-mover advantages that once buoyed the cooperative were all but negated.  
According to Christensen, “when the same analytical and decision-making processes learned 
in the school of sustaining innovation are applied to enabling or disruptive technologies, the 
effect on the company can be paralyzing.”116  In this case, a once-disruptive strategy grown 
static became prohibitive.   
 The likely motive explaining the AP’s refusal to confer legitimacy upon emerging 
radio news networks, as Porter argues, is that “it is very common for firms to view the 
competitor that is closest to them in market share and has the most similar strategy as the 
greatest enemy.”117  The AP fixated on UP and INS, competitors of familiar complexion.  In 
the process, it overlooked a new attacker “at the periphery,” as Foster and Kaplan 
illustrate.118  Because strategic planning is often consumed by existing mental models, it 
glosses over outside threats that may be plotting to “capitalize on new capabilities, new 
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technologies, and new ways of doing business” to better satisfy consumer needs.119  Even if 
the AP wanted to jump into radio at that stage, Christensen contends that it would have 
struggled due to its “delay in making the strategic commitment to enter” during the medium’s 
early, meteoric growth phrase.120  
 Radio’s rise signaled ominous times ahead for the AP in the defense of territory it had 
long-controlled.  The emerging medium possessed many characteristics that undermined the 
cooperative’s credibility and undercut its differentiation advantage.  In his recent book, 
Columbia University economist Eli Noam characterizes radio’s arrival from the periphery as 
an early glimpse into “one of the fundamental trends of the digital environment.”  In this new 
sphere, “entrants are attracted by the growth characteristics and the lower entry barriers 
relative to the past (see Part II: 23).”121  Monopolies and duopolies are replaced by a 
perfectly competitive environment in which advantages are leveraged from businesses to 
consumers.  This occurs as lowered entry walls, chiseled down by the technological 
advantages of new firms, broaden the boundaries of substitutability.  In the 1930s and 1940s 
as radio networks grew, they induced local broadcasters to switch over from wire service by 
giving them a dynamic, timely format by which to present news to consumers.  Even though 
radio bore no physical resemblance to the newspapers of yesteryear, it became a “functional 
substitute”122 for the news wire by providing buyers with “more value relative to its price 
than the product currently being used.123   
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 When the moat dries up and functional substitutes storm the gates, Nagle forecasts a 
shift in consumer psychology that hones in on price as a primary variable by which to 
distinguish among the growing field of competitors (see Part III: 35).  The AP’s waning 
“differentiation value” lowers its overall “economic value.”124   Its status in the minds of 
potential consumers changes as the “fairness effect” comes into play.  Buyers become 
increasingly sensitive to a product’s price if they believe it is outside the range that they 
perceive as reasonable when compared to the alternatives.125  Radio ushered in powerful 
change across three of Porter’s “Five Competitive Forces that Determine Industry 
Profitability”: the entry of new competitors, the threat of substitutes and the bargaining 
power of buyers.”126  In the process, it compromised the many of the AP’s advantages, 
turning the focus to price.   
 Television’s rapid saturation into the American home in the late 1950s and early 
1960s also interrupted traditional wire service.127  Although the two platforms never clashed 
as directly as the AP did with radio in the first half of the century, they did jockey for 
consumers and relevance…and still do.  TV networks’ ability to feed video news to local 
affiliates, and much later to Internet websites, originated another channel that the AP was 
slow to tap.128  TV’s rise also impaired newspapers’ position in the marketplace.  The total 
number of daily newspapers stagnated throughout the 1960s and began a nosedive from that 
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point forward.129  With the growth of its partners stunted, the AP saw its growth plateau.  
Phillip Cook, Douglas Gomery and Lawrence Lichty found that between 1960 and 1985, “the 
total contracts for major wire services fell by 12.3 percent,” while the number of newspapers 
buying multiple wire services declined by 15.6 percent.130   
 Seeing newspapers’ struggles, new competitors, emboldened by lowered entry 
barriers and heartened by a widening definition of substitutability, now attack the AP from 
every angle, even from within.  In “Share and Share Alike,” Sherry Ricciardi cites several 
examples of daily newspapers that have created their own state news-sharing arrangements to 
lessen dependence on the AP.  The most prominent is in Ohio, where, in April 2008, eight of 
the state’s largest newspapers “agreed to share content on a private Web site after publicly 
opposing a new AP rate structure.”131  The Ohio Newspaper Organization (OHNO) will be 
explored as part of one of the paper’s three case studies in which the origins of the news 
exchange, its long-range viability, its effect on AP’s value proposition, and the cooperative’s 
response will all be examined.  Ohio is not alone, though.  Florida, Maine, Montana New 
Hampshire and New York have all launched similar initiatives to act as AP substitutes.132  
These syndicates are formed around common criticisms of the AP.  First, according to 
Nashua Telegraph (NH) Vice President for News David Solomon, the AP’s price “does not 
correlate with the amount of syndicated material we actually use.”133  As its value 
proposition wanes, there are fewer costs in switching than staying.  Solomon continues, “life 
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is possible without the Associated Press.”134  Meanwhile, rival newspapers in North Carolina 
and Texas have entered into modified sharing arrangements designed to minimize costs 
without wiping out entire reporting beats.135  The Charlotte Observer and Raleigh News & 
Observer, for instance, combined their feature and sports sections and statehouse coverage.136  
These agreements have not entirely replace the AP, but they signal local outlets’ willingness 
to ask candid questions of value and look beyond full-service wires to fill their news holes.     
 Outside of the membership cooperative, supplemental wires began to consume a more 
prominent place in newspapers as dailies refused to pay for a second wire service and 
searched for ways to bolster coverage without cutting too many corners.  During the same 
twenty-five year window – 1960 to 1985 – that total newspapers and paid circulation stalled 
and then descended, directly undercutting wire service growth, supplemental wire contracts 
boomed by 196.9 percent.137   Services such as The New York Times News Service, The Los 
Angeles Times/Washington Post News Service and more recently McClatchy-Tribune 
Information Services provided cheaper alternatives; a newspaper could print stories by 
“dozens of dailies without paying for a full-service wire.”138  Often the difference in price is 
stark.139  This allows supplementals to wrest away wire business by “tailor[ing] a package 
that meets the editorial requirements of the smaller papers at a price they can afford.”140  
Fused together, these advantages make “supplemental” a misnomer.  NYTNS editor John 
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Brewer restates the role of the supplemental wire as an “alternative to the AP,” not a 
sidekick.141 
 The greatest modern threat to the AP’s relevance and long-term survival may arise, 
ironically, from those who profit by amassing the AP and its members’ original work and 
then selling advertising against it.  These digital aggregators are too profuse to list in full, 
though prominent names include Google, Yahoo!, The Huffington Post, and The Drudge 
Report.  At the AP’s annual meeting in April 2009, Singleton, incensed by these aggregators’ 
perceived misappropriation of the AP’s highly-expensed work, lashed out: “We’re mad as 
hell, and we’re not going to take it anymore.”142   
 Yet for all its bluster, the AP previously brokered deals with certain online providers, 
Yahoo! and Google News among them, licensing its content for carry by these search portals 
(see Part I: 13).143  The Google News deal involved only AP-generated content.  Local 
members were not included, albeit a small percentage of their material was re-purposed by 
the cooperative in the agreement.  Certain subscribers protested.  Curley defended it as digital 
survival: “If you don’t fill the void in the market, someone else will.  Your competitor is 
enfranchised.”144  The fallout has been a fractured relationship between the AP and many of 
its longtime members, who fail to see eye-to-eye on the cooperative’s future strategy for 
defining its core business and defending its constituents.  
 The turbulence rocking the digital world resembles a technophile’s Wild West.  
New attackers spring forward in droves, defenders fight back, and law struggles to keep pace 
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with the seismic shifts in the new-media landscape.  Many traditional conglomerates, too 
preoccupied with “pursuing expensive acquisition and globalization strategies,”145 ignore 
what should be their most pressing concern – “barriers to entry [that] are the source of value 
creation for shareholders (see Part II: 21).”146  As a result, attackers are enabled, and their 
sustainability is bolstered. 
 Maxwell McCombs approaches sustainability differently through his amended 
study of “the relative constancy approach to consumer spending for media.”147  Upon 
conclusion of his original research in 1972, McCombs declared that “no new funds will be 
attracted to the mass communication marketplace by new products and services because the 
total mass media pie always is a constant proportion of the general economy.”148  This would 
have been damning for entrants, who would not enjoy much chance of survival if their only 
option is to steal existing advertising revenue from well-established firms.  By 1988, noting 
the spike in spending on cable TV and VCRs, McCombs acknowledged that the increase 
“came largely from new money attracted to the marketplace by these innovations.”  
Accordingly, digital attackers such as the aforementioned aggregators can take heart in the 
larger pie that potentially awaits them.  Or, perhaps their competitive advantages enable them 
to steal slivers from existing media.  Either way, the onus falls on the AP to reinvent to re-
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build its differentiation barriers and re-imagine to reinstate its intrinsic value.  The seminal 
question is, “can it?”   
Part III: Reinventing the Core to Sustain and Survive  
 The Associated Press has an uneven track record with regard to reform.  At times, 
it pioneered new paths in wire delivery and news gathering, leading the crusade for 
journalism at large.  At others, it lagged behind, stubbornly opposing industry changes that 
challenged its core or barely recognizing them at all.149  More than just a series of random 
advances or roadblocks, the AP’s bumpy history of progress is inexorably tied to leadership.  
The culture of innovation, or lack thereof, perpetuated by particular leaders, laid the 
groundwork for the technology and journalism that followed.    
 As previously noted, when Craig became general manager in 1851, he moved 
quickly to re-define the purpose of the company from “news gatherer” to “news vendor” (see 
Part I: 5-6).150  He backed his soaring mission with measures that solidified the AP’s ability 
to deliver on this strategy.151  Folkerts, Teeter and Caudill quote an 1854 memo that Craig 
circulated throughout the organization calling on improved news reporting through a singular 
focus only on the “material facts,” not “expressions of opinions.”152  The result was a more 
stringent demand for accuracy that raised the standard of the telegraphic reports.153 
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 Craig saw the potential for what Harvard leadership scholar Ron Heifetz calls 
“adaptive work” – that there are a whole host of issues “that are not amenable to…standard 
operating procedures.”154  Adaptive change contradicts “technical” work, which Foster and 
Kaplan find many convergent-thinking managers obsessing over in an effort to control 
instead of innovate.155  They also stress that Heifetz’s adaptive process begins with mindset, 
and that innovation is the residue of this liberated mental model (see Part I: 7).156  The 
process of innovation is values-driven.  Christensen insists that leaders “need to do more than 
assign the right resources to the problem.”  They must “scrutinize whether the organization’s 
processes and values fit the problem.”157  This relates to one of Collins’ chief theses: that 
technology is only as effective as the leadership strategy for its application.  He hypothesizes 
that companies that make the leap to greatness “think differently about the role of 
technology.  They never use technology as the primary means of igniting a 
transformation.”158  Craig’s “Hedgehog” (see Part I: 6) was that the AP blossom into a 
national news vendor.  He used technology, primarily through the exclusive use of 
telegraphic lines, as a driver to execute this divergent business model.   
 Melville Stone was arguably the AP’s most prominent general manager, serving in 
that capacity for 29 years.  Stone chased off the UP, aggressively recruited new publishers 
and articulated the AP’s guiding standard for who and how it would serve.159  To this day, a 
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quote from Stone remains in the AP’s “Statement of News Values and Principles.”160  Stone, 
however, maintained the domineering strictures that would stunt the AP’s growth and allow 
formidable competitors to enter.  Granted, he did galvanize the cooperative’s beliefs, but by 
catering so singularly to the needs of newspapers, he may have closed an ear to the call of 
new markets.161   
 His successor, Kent Cooper, proved superior in understanding how the proper 
application of technology could change the scale and scope of the wire business.  These 
innovations enabled him to revolutionize the brand of journalism that the AP produced.162  
To push transformation through the company, Cooper launched two paramount technological 
initiatives.  First, in 1933, he fully converted the national news wire to Teletypes, which 
allowed transmission at a then-buzzing 60 words-per-minute.  Then in 1935, “he took the AP 
into the picture business” through the wire delivery of news photos.163  The AP operated the 
first commercially successful system of photo distribution.164   
 When leadership was not as progressive, the AP failed to initiate change.  Instead, 
it reacted to it.  The cooperative’s frostiness toward new members has been widely blamed 
for limiting its formative growth.  It similarly cut off potential new business lines in its slow, 
stubborn response to radio news networks (see Part II: 19-20).  As television entered the 
mainstream in the 1960s, it not only weakened newspapers by offering services that the 
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printed page could not, but in the process harmed the AP and spurred major technological 
changes to maintain the wire’s value proposition to its members.  These included “massive 
expenditures for terminals, computers, and satellite stations”165 that would “centralize and 
speed up the handling of copy and reduce the cost of leasing landlines.”166  Television also 
had profound journalistic effects on the AP.  Because television signals were immediate, and 
dynamic, they forced wire services to “reassess their devotion to spot-news coverage” and 
instead commit more heavily to enterprise reporting (see Part II: 22-23).167  This was both a 
concession and a survival tactic.   
 Curley, the AP’s current CEO since 2003, now finds himself wrestling with many 
of these quandaries: fending off a swarm of new attackers, battening down during economic 
and industry distress, reinventing his firm’s differentiated advantages while preserving its 
core mission to its traditional members, re-defining its future strategy map and 
communicating this value system throughout every hallway and every bureau of the 
sprawling company.  Many of the issues are technological, as the wire struggles to counteract 
digital aggregators who face few barriers to entry and are saddled by no legacy costs or 
constituent demands.  Upon arrival as CEO, however, Curley first focused on clearly 
understanding the essence of the cooperative so that all technological innovations he unveiled 
would align with the central mission of the AP.  He acknowledges that one of his early 
shortcomings as CEO was “failing to understand the core cultural success foundations.”168  
He has since made significant efforts to better understand the journalistic passions of his staff 
and directly support their efforts. 
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“I wish I’d been smart enough to figure this out, but when you come in from the 
outside, people check you out here.  I was checked out thoroughly.  You get branded, 
and so I was the business guy brought in to shore up the finances.  But when I came 
out and said that the First Amendment was in peril and we need to fight for it, it really 
connected with the frontline journalists.  That’s an important leadership point – how 
do you connect?”169 
 Such leadership initiatives gave him a measure of credibility within the 
organization to introduce major technological changes that affect both the cooperative itself 
and the members it touches.  The changes have taken two forms.  The first are facilitators 
that enhance the speed, efficiency and usefulness of existing content.  The second are new 
products and services offered to members that strive to increase the AP’s value proposition 
by either providing them with new revenue streams or protective barriers around their 
original work.    
 In April 2007, the cooperative rolled out the first of four regional editing desks in 
Atlanta, with future hubs planned for Chicago, Philadelphia and Phoenix.  The chief goal was 
to streamline workflow.  This would enable faster and more efficient story editing, improving 
the quality of the product that local members pulled.  Recently, the AP updated its 
storytelling protocol from “1-2-3” to “0-1-2-3-4” to allow for greater customization across 
every conceivable platform, thus boosting the usage value of content to members.170  These 
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advances embody the AP’s firm belief that the old business model no longer applies, that a 
“shift from supply push to demand pull” is mandatory as this is how media and their 
customers consume news.171   
 The AP is currently sampling two new products for members, one established to 
provide a new delivery platform that opens potential revenue streams, the other developed to 
ward off digital vultures from scavenging the original work that members spend time, money 
and human resources to produce.  In April 2008, Curley unveiled AP Mobile News Network, 
a multimedia application for wireless devices.  Mobile News Network marked the first 
product released as part of the AP’s Digital Cooperative, “a program designed to find new 
digital outlets for the news and information produced by AP members.”172  The new mobile 
platform launched as a brand extension that afforded local members opportunities to both 
showcase their content and sell local advertising against it.  More than 1,000 sources 
currently subscribe, though the actual revenue generated from it remains spotty.  While the 
AP authored its Mobile News Network to create advertising opportunities, it recently 
unfurled its pilot for a News Registry, or as Curley described, “a news map or guide to the 
authoritative source of news, which is to say, who breaks the news?”173  Over 1,400 members 
have agreed to participate in this “self-referring network,”174 which aims to “take back the 
night”175 and regain control of content from the aggregators – both search portals and 
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crowdsourcers – who have taken the audience away from the content producers themselves.  
More initiatives are under construction, including the recently-announced Gateway, which 
aspires to create digital platforms and products that AP and its members can collectively take 
to market.176  These extensions and enhancements symbolize the AP’s exigent interest in 
maneuvering out of decline and back into maturity by re-positioning itself for the long-term 
rather than harvesting profits in the short run.177 
 For each of these innovations – both new products and services and existing 
product augmentations – the AP faces dual challenges.  It must not only create the 
technology that furthers its differentiation advantage as the “essential global news network,” 
but it must crystallize its value proposition to constituents so that perceptions of value match 
advances in technology and overcome concerns over price.  Armstrong and Kotler advocate 
that the most successful brands supersede selling product attributes and customer benefits 
and are instead “positioned on strong beliefs and values” that engage customers “on a deep, 
emotional level.”178  The “attribute theory” holds that “consumers derive utility not from the 
products themselves but from the characteristics or attributes provided by the products.”179  
Thus, business success is not simply a byproduct of technological advancement and new 
product development, but of truly “understanding what is desirable performance from the 
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buyer’s viewpoint.”  As Hoskins, McFadyen and Finn ask, “How easy is it for consumers to 
discern the attributes provided by a given product?”180 
 The offerings of the firm and the needs of the customer are often conjoined 
powerfully through marketing.  Theodore Levitt argues that “the way a company manages its 
marketing can become the most powerful form of differentiation.”181  According to Porter, a 
chief means of marketing value occurs through signaling.182  Differentiation, he contends, 
results not only from creating buyer value – in the AP’s case, through enhanced product and 
service offerings – but “from the ability to signal that value so that buyers perceive it.”183  
Signaling must position a brand squarely “within target customers’ minds.”184  Advertising 
often receives the lion’s share of the attention as the pivotal signaling criteria, but the 
marketing chain also includes reputation/image, history, properties of learning, current 
market share, price and other dynamics185…all of which fuse together to create “the brand 
experience.”186   
 In certain areas, James T. Hamilton contends, reputed media franchises like the AP 
enjoy inherent strengths.  He thinks they may have an advantage “in brand name recognition: 
faced with limited time, viewers may forgo the costs of searching out new sites and rely on 
the reputation of established companies as a short cut to finding reliable news.”187  
Furthermore, whereas many feel that traditional media is shifting entirely online, he takes a 
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different tack, arguing that the “the variety of choices on the Internet enhances the 
advantages of brands established in the physical world.”188  Christensen, Foster, Kaplan and 
Noam, among others, would find fault in this logic, contending that enhanced digital choice 
promotes encourages substitutability.   
 Either way, it begs this question: is the AP’s marketing strategy sufficiently 
streamlined to send out the proper signaling criteria to its customers?  If so, then these 
messages should reinforce its renewed differentiation advantage.  The residue of well-
articulated differentiation is consumer demand.  Demand is embodied in “switching costs.”189  
If those switching costs are high, then constituents are less likely to consider a leap 
elsewhere.  Further, if the AP can prop up differentiation as its chief advantage, then it can 
minimize price as the primary variable by which members measure its value and ultimately 
decide whether or not to stay (see Part II: 22).190  Firms can only re-direct the focus from 
price in so far as their product differentiation – whether through quality or competitive scope 
– outweighs the leveraging position of substitutes.  Clearly the AP is in the midst of this 
battle, with many of its constituents pondering if life is indeed possible without the wire.191  
To win it, the cooperative must answer multiple defining questions.  What is the AP’s value 
proposition to its constituents?  Is it adequately signaling its vision and value to members 
through marketing?  How can it improve?  Speaking of constituents, how will the AP define 
its future clientele, and how will those stakeholders evolve?  Finally, and perhaps most 
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critically, how strong is the AP’s differentiation advantage compared to substitutes?  And did 
it wait too long to innovate, thereby endangering its long-term viability?192   
III. Research Questions  
1. Building the Core Business:  Historically, how has the AP served its newspaper 
constituents, in this case two North Carolina dailies?  How has their wire usage differed 
based on community needs, reader demographics, and other factors?  During a time of 
“creative destruction,” how are these papers re-imagining their core purpose?  As a result, 
how is AP’s presence in Section A trending?  What changes could this transition portend for 
the future role that AP plays in these broadsheets? 
2. Protecting the Core from Internal Threats:  How have state wire exchanges established 
by AP members increased their own efficiencies while reducing their reliance on AP?  In 
turn, what effect have these organization had on APs value proposition?  Where do local 
affiliates still see the greatest value in the AP wire?  Have they scaled back their service, or 
canceled entirely?  How sustainable, and potentially profitable, are these arrangements?   
3. Reinventing the Core:  How is AP re-imagining its business model in order to sustain 
itself and bolster its value proposition to members during a period disruptive change?  How 
is it re-conceptualizing itself as a revenue partner for the industry?  What initiatives is it 
introducing to execute this strategy, and how are these efforts being received in the 
marketplace by members who are struggling to survive?  How could AP’s vision for the 
future alter the fundamental business-to-business architecture that girds the cooperative?  If 
dramatic changes occur, can AP press on as “the essential global news network?”        
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IV. Methods 
This paper employs a case study method, using both quantitative and qualitative 
analysis to explore historical trending of AP story usage by member newspapers and AP’s 
subsequent attempt to re-position its business value proposition to members during a period 
of “creative destruction.” 
Case Study #1: Building the Core – Charting AP Usage by North Carolina Newspapers 
The first case uses content analysis to track AP story usage and reliance patterns of 
two North Carolina newspapers – the Charlotte Observer and The Fayetteville Observer – 
from 1985 through 2008.  The two publications were selected for sampling based on their 
distinctiveness in several areas: circulation, community demographics, and ownership 
structure.  Charlotte, corporately owned by The McClatchy Company, touts the largest daily 
circulation in North Carolina – nearly 252,000193 – and serves a top-25 designated market 
area (DMA).194  As the leading metropolis in the state, Charlotte features diverse 
demography, with minorities comprising 44 percent of its population.  Fayetteville, by 
contrast, is family-owned-and-operated and services the 128th DMA, with a daily circulation 
of just over 63,000.195  The city is regarded as a military community because of nearby Fort 
Bragg, home to the 82nd Airborne Division.  Its presence ensures that much of Fayetteville’s 
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citizenry originates from diverse backgrounds, with many residents claiming no historical 
community connection because of the transience of military life.  Based on these unique 
profiles, the two dailies are assumed to have different needs from wire services.  
 The study surveys usage in five-year increments, starting in 1985.  Six issues, one 
every-other-month, are coded for each newspaper in each year.  The exact same days in each 
year are analyzed across both papers to ensure a random yet consistent sample.  The sample 
rotates by year to broaden the cross-section.  The study specifically targets news dependence.  
As a result, Section A – the primary news hub – is coded in its entirety, with emphasis also 
placed on front-page story selection.  
The coding protocol is subdivided into multiple sections.  All Section A stories are 
marked as “AP,” “other wire” (supplementals), or “locally-reported.” AP and locally-
produced content are then tagged by category – “local” (community, city, county), “state,” 
“national,” and “international” – to chart the specific needs that the AP serves for these 
dailies, as well as how the newspapers are deploying their local resources.   
Findings were then shared with the executive teams in Charlotte and Fayetteville to 
verify that the trending was representative and to elicit their own reaction to the results of the 
sampling.    
Case Study #2: Protecting the Core – The Ohio News Organization 
The second case explores a particular type of threat challenging AP’s sustainability: 
competition from within.  In-depth interviews were conducted with editors and publishers 
who question the AP’s value proposition to their newspapers and have created their own 
localized facsimile to lessen dependence on the cooperative.  The case originates with the 
Ohio News Organization (OHNO), a pioneering statewide news-sharing arrangement that AP 
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members in other states are now replicating.  Executives at several Ohio dailies were asked to 
trace the origins of their state wire, discuss the successes and struggles of the arrangement, 
opine on the AP’s value proposition, project OHNO’s long-term viability, and share how 
their concept has been modeled by others.  A similar cooperative in Maine, as well as 
McClatchy’s burgeoning Regional News service, are explored as competitive alternatives, 
their leaders interviewed at length.   
AP’s executive team, led by Vice President and Director of Strategic Planning Jim 
Kennedy, was then interviewed to respond to these organically-grown internal threats, from 
how the organization is addressing potential defectors to how it is bolstering its value 
proposition to those who may be seeking substitutes.  
Case Study #3: Reinventing the Core – Gateway and Other AP Initiatives 
The final case examines the recent evolution of the AP as it seeks to re-imagine its  
business model to ensure sustainability.  This was a three-step iterative process.  The first 
step involved in-depth interviews with 18 editors and publishers at selected member 
newspapers (see Sources/Interviews: 123-125).  The second involved in-depth interviews 
with AP’s executive team, including Kennedy and CEO Tom Curley.  AP also provided 
extensive documents about its business during these interviews.  In the third, I re-interviewed 
the members to ascertain how well AP’s articulation of its goals and business-model strategy 
was being communicated back to them.  This cross-section represents twelve different 
publications, ranging from small-circulation dailies (Maine’s Lewiston Sun Journal, 34,000 
daily circulation) to major metros (Florida’s St. Petersburg Times, 422,000 daily circulation) 
and encompassing seven states.     
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V. Limitations 
 Inherent limitations exist in quantitative research of this kind.  The coding protocol 
was carefully prepared.  However, constructing a sample that is large enough to be 
representative was challenging considering the time constraints on the project.    Future 
research could design a more thorough content analysis to ensure greater reliability of results.  
Also, a small daily newspaper could be added to the sample to improve balance, with 
Fayetteville as a mid-sized paper and Charlotte as a large metro.   
The selection of issue dates was completely random and followed the same pattern 
for both dailies to ensure continuity.  By happenstance, two of the six periods of analysis 
(2000 and 2008) were Presidential election years, increasing the probability of anomaly 
because of expanded overall coverage, especially nationally.  In certain years, Sunday issues 
were not coded, also a byproduct of the random sample.   
 Both Charlotte and Fayetteville regularly combine AP and local content together 
under the header “from staff and wire reports.”  These hybrids are often wire stories with 
local angles written into them.  These Section A stories were coded as local articles, although 
at least a portion of their content emanated from wire sources, including the AP.      
 The protocol called for coding Section A content only.  While Section A performs 
vital news-sharing and audience-inviting roles, the sample does neglect local and wire 
material in other sections.  Notably, Section B in both papers focuses on local and state 
content.  Many staff resources are dedicated to these areas, potentially skewing the local 
results in the sample.  Some AP reporting landed in this section as well and was unaccounted 
for.     
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 Qualitative interviews also carry inherent limitations, notably the potential bias of the 
interviewer and the subjectivity of the interviewees.  For that reason, a broad range of targets 
were interviewed to offer diverse perspectives.  These interviews were exhaustively 
researched and then written according to a standardized template to promote consistency.   
 Also, while the AP and its members shared much of their information, certain data 
were proprietary or unavailable.  As such, they were either unwilling or unable to supply it, 
which limited the study. 
 .  
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2 
 
Building the Core Business: A Case Study Examination of Two North Carolina Daily 
Newspapers’ Historical – and Changing – Use of the Associated Press 
 
“You’d pick up the A Section back in the eighties, and there would be one local story and the 
rest would be wire.  Over time, I do think there has been a move to put more local 
there…probably even more so in recent years.” 
- Charles Broadwell, President and Publisher of The Fayetteville Observer 
 
“We get readers who say, ‘we want more local news from you; we can get other news from 
the Internet and TV,’  When you start pulling away that stuff, [then] they start saying, ‘why 
don’t we have a regional-worthy newspaper?’  You get this real split, and you can’t appease 
everyone.” 
- Rich Mathieson, Charlotte Observer National Editor 
 
Charles Broadwell remembers a time when the Associated Press felt as much like a 
family member as it did a news partner.  Broadwell and his management team at The 
Fayetteville Observer, a mid-sized eastern North Carolina daily that he serves as President 
and Publisher of, would meet every month with AP’s North Carolina bureau chief Ambrose 
Dudley, stationed just up the road in Raleigh.  “He’d come down and go out to lunch with 
us,” Broadwell recalled. 
For decades, this nuclear bond was shared between the AP and the now-1,332 daily 
newspapers that own it.  AP’s dual role as a content producer and vendor of both original and 
re-purposed material from around the state, the country, and the world was an enduring 
cornerstone of the American news organization.  Its breaking news reports were essential, 
delivered with unrivaled speed and told with authoritative accuracy and voice.  Sports and 
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business wires, primarily agate services, were trademarks.  And the state wire exhaustively 
covered what local outlets could not.  Fundamental to its cooperative structure, AP leaned on 
these partner papers – regional and local dailies like The Observer – to pay the freight and 
supply the stories1 for re-distribution that sustained its global news services.  Members paid 
handsomely to participate, with annual assessments averaging $143,000 per paper, but 
exceeding $1 million in major metros.2   
However, as the print industry – and traditional journalism across every medium – is 
jarred by secular change, newspapers must exigently re-assess what they stand for, who they 
serve, and how they can reinvent themselves to survive.  As they morph into increasingly 
locally-centered news franchises, longstanding AP constituents are weighing the costs and 
benefits of their wire use.   
Meanwhile, born of necessity, the AP re-shuffled its deck, too.  The Ambrose 
Dudley’s of a bygone news era are have retired; now the bureau chief is headquartered in 
Atlanta and canvasses four states.  Long gone are monthly lunches with members and the 
familial bond they symbolized, replaced by a series of core-altering decisions about how to 
create essential, enduring value and whom to deliver it to.3     
To postulate what the AP’s future role in traditional broadsheets may become, one 
must understand how members have historically accessed the wire service, and how usage is 
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Complete AP membership. 
3
 Kennedy, Jim.  “Follow-Ups.”  Message to Jed Williams.  E-mail.  25 Feb. 2010.  AP’s business partners now 
include diverse sources beyond newspapers.  According to Vice President and Director of Strategic Planning, 
domestic print revenue accounts for 26 percent of AP’s total income, down from 50 percent in the mid-1980s.  
International subscriptions total 21 percent of revenue, domestic broadcast 19, and digital licensing 17.  
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trending today.  This case study samples Section A content over a 23-year period (1985-
2008) from two North Carolina AP member dailies, the Charlotte Observer and The 
Fayetteville Observer, to examine their use of the cooperative (see Thesis 
Proposal/Methodology: 38-39).  The results reveal shifting fault lines in the relationship and 
presage what the future could hold.  
The two publications were selected for sampling based on their distinctiveness in 
several areas: circulation, community demographics, and ownership structure.  Charlotte, 
corporately owned by The McClatchy Company, touts the largest daily circulation in North 
Carolina – nearly 252,0004 – and serves a top-25 designated market area (DMA).5  As the 
leading metropolis in the state, Charlotte features diverse demography, with minorities 
comprising 44 percent of its population.  Fayetteville, by contrast, is family-owned-and-
operated and services the 128th DMA with a daily circulation of just over 63,000.6  The city 
is regarded as a military community because of nearby Fort Bragg, home to the 82nd Airborne 
Division.  Its presence ensures that much of Fayetteville’s citizenry originates from diverse 
backgrounds, with many residents claiming no historical community connection because of 
the transience of military life.   
Content was coded by source: AP wire, supplemental wire, and locally-reported (see 
Thesis Proposal/Methodology: 38-39).  Subsequently, AP and locally-produced stories were 
                                                          
4
 NCPress.com.  “North Carolina Daily Newspaper Circulation.”   
See http://www.ncpress.com/ncps/Display%20Network%20Papers%20-%20Statewide.pdf.  As of November 
2009, Charlotte has a daily circulation of 193,577 and a Sunday circulation of 252,300. 
5
 Arbitron.com.  “Arbitron Radio Market Rankings: Metro 12+ Population.”  
See http://www.arbitron.com/home/mm001050.asp.  The Charlotte Observer represents the 24
th
 largest 
market.   
6
 Arbitron.com.  “Arbitron Radio Market Rankings: Metro 12+ Population.”   
See http://www.arbitron.com/home/mm001050.asp.  The Fayetteville Observer represents the 127
th
 largest 
market.  
NCPress.com.  “North Carolina Daily Newspaper Circulation.”   
See http://www.ncpress.com/ncps/Display%20Network%20Papers%20-%20Statewide.pdf.  As of November 
2009, it has a daily circulation of 63,000. 
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subdivided and analyzed by category.7  Any article with AP attribution, even a brief, was 
marked as such.  Stories tagged as “from staff and wire reports” were recorded as local 
stories, even though they can feature a medley of sources (see Thesis Proposal/Limitations to 
Methodology: 41).    
 
Charlotte and Fayetteville: Wired Differently  
 Content analysis of Section A of the Charlotte Observer and The Fayetteville 
Observer highlight distinct differences and shifting trends in Associated Press usage.  These 
results reflect notable contrasts in the way the two dailies look to the AP to service their 
reader communities, while foreshadowing future shifts in the fundamental role of the wire in 
a newspaper.  
The Fayetteville Observer, a mid-sized daily without the financial resources or depth 
of staff of Charlotte, depended heavily on the AP to fill out its A Section over the course of 
the sample (see Appendix A: “Fayetteville’s Associated Press Usage Patterns, 1985-2008,” 
for a full report).8  AP pieces outnumbered stories from other wire services and locally-
reported material by a nearly-five-to-one margin.  “The AP is a foundation,” Broadwell said.  
Fayetteville leaned on the AP chiefly for national, then international news.  Broadwell is 
quick to point out that with Fort Bragg in its backyard, and its soldiers deployed across the 
globe, Fayetteville has a military presence that gives its community unique international 
needs.  “Haiti is a local story for us,” he said.  “Iraq, Afghanistan – we’ve paid a lot of 
attention to it on the front page.  Right now we probably have 10,000 soldiers in those areas.”   
                                                          
7
 AP categories included national, international, and state stories.  Locally-produced content was tagged as 
local, state, or national. 
8
 Arbitron.com and NCPress.com, supra note 6.  
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In recent periods, however, AP trends evinced signs of change.  Even as AP remained 
a staple of Fayetteville’s Section A, its relative use retreated.  From 1990 through 2008, AP 
story volume waned by 34 percent.  
The Charlotte Observer, the largest daily newspaper serving the biggest metro area in 
North Carolina,9 also utilized the AP prevalently, but never as singularly as Fayetteville (see 
Appendix B: “Charlotte’s Associated Press Usage Patterns, 1985-2008,” for a full report).  
Overall, Section A wire inventory flattened out across the sample – with the exception of 
Presidential elections in 2000 and 2008 – and AP presence fell relative to local reports.  
Content choices were more balanced across the AP, supplemental wires, and local reports.  
This contrasted with Fayetteville’s intense dependence on the AP and near non-existent 
usage of other wires.  The disparity underscores two economically-driven dynamics that 
differentiate the two dailies: Charlotte’s deeper editorial budget supported a larger local 
reporting staff, enabling more in-house content, and also afforded it access to a wider array 
of outside news services.  Supplementals were both prominent and diverse.  While 
Fayetteville drew almost exclusively from the Los Angeles Times-Washington Post News 
Service as a secondary wire source, Charlotte pulled from The New York Times News 
Service, Bloomberg, and Knight Ridder Wire Service, and later, McClatchy-Tribune 
Information Services, co-owned by its parent company.   
 
“The Vanishing Newspaper”  
At a macro level, a critical similarity leaps out immediately: the total story volume 
and aggregate news inches comprising Section A declined precipitously across the sample, 
according to the executive teams at both papers.  As news hole shrunk, Charlotte and 
                                                          
9
 NCPress.com, supra note 4, and Arbitron.com, supra note 5.   
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Fayetteville’s AP dependence withered– or, at minimum, stalled – as did their supplemental 
wire reliance.  Retrenching nationally, these papers began to unite their focus around 
protecting and bolstering the local content franchises that differentiated them from the field.  
 Charlotte’s aggregate Section A story count in 1985 was 126 news stories coded over 
the six-issue sample.  By 2005, that number dwindled to 110, a 13 percent slide (see Table C: 
“Charlotte Observer Coding/Content Analysis Results Table”).  Apparent aberrations 
surfaced during high-profile election years.10 Otherwise, Section A inventory consistently 
declined.  As a function of news hole reduction, related cost cutting, and increased local 
franchising, Charlotte scaled back its AP membership to the Limited tier of Member Choice 
as of January 2010,11 thereby reducing the volume of wire content it can access on a daily 
basis.12   
 Fayetteville sustained an even more pronounced dip in overall Section A news 
content (see Table A: “The Fayetteville Observer Coding/Content Analysis Results Table”).  
From 1985 to 2005, total story count fell by 31 percent, from 134 to 93.  As it consolidated 
                                                          
10
 After back-to-back slippages in Section A content in 1990 and 1995, Charlotte increased its sampled story 
count to 118 in 2000, the year of the controversial George W. Bush/Al Gore Presidential contest marked by 
the Florida vote re-count.  In 2008, with high-profile gubernatorial and senatorial elections in North Carolina 
and Barack Obama’s historic ascendance to President, Charlotte published 133 stories in the sample, a 20.1 
percent jump from 2005.  In both cases, the swell in coverage did not come from within, but was almost 
wholly driven by AP inventory increases of 29.5 percent and 35.2 percent respectively.  Not coincidentally, 
Charlotte’s greatest reliance on the AP for Section A coverage occurred in 2000 and 2008. 
11
 See http://www.ap.org/choice/details.html.  
12
 AP.org.  “New AP pricing and packaging plan to take effect in 2009; AP Board approves ‘Member Choice,’ 
making more content available and easier to find.”  25 Oct. 2007  
<http://www.ap.org/pages/about/pressreleases/pr_102507a.html<http://www.ap.org/pages/about/pressrele
ases/pr_102507a.html>.  “With Member Choice, members will pay a basic assessment that gives them access 
to all AP state, national and international breaking news….For additional fees, members will be able to buy 
premium services featuring in-depth content in news analysis, business, sports, entertainment and lifestyles.  
In addition, for the first time, members will be able to buy these stories on an a la carte basis.”  
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news operations, The Observer accordingly weaned subsistence from AP, even as it remained 
a Complete subscriber to Member Choice.13 
 These numbers reinforce ominous national trends: newspaper circulation is 
plummeting, and as it does, the premium advertising and paid subscription revenue streams 
that fund the news ecosystem follow in turn, thereby shrinking the news hole and peeling off 
layers of content.14  Many of those layers are wire services, both AP and supplemental, that 
no longer have a home in dailies’ now locally-directed pages.  While circulation remained 
relatively constant from 2000 through 2007, paid circulation withered by 11.5 million since 
1985.15  “It’s a share of a smaller pie,” Broadwell said.  “That’s the big driver.”    
 
Going Local 
 The number of newspapers subscribing to multiple full-service news wires has 
dropped off significantly since 1960.16  Furthermore, many journalism scholars suggest that 
as economic peril strikes local newsrooms, these organizations would be wise to reinvent 
their brands as locally-targeted community news services rather than all-encompassing 
aggregators.  A re-conception of this kind would seemingly negate the need for the majority 
                                                          
13
 See http://www.ap.org/choice/pdfs/AP%20Complete_np_ms.pdf.  
14
 The PEW Research Center’s Project for Excellence in Journalism: An Annual Report on American Journalism: 
The State of the News Media 2010.  Washington, D.C.: The PEW Charitable Trust, March 2010. 
See http://www.stateofthemedia.org/2010/newspapers_charts_tables.php.  
15
 “Daily and Sunday Newspapers: Number and Circulation,” Table 1093.  Editor and Publisher International 
Year Book, 2008.  See also NAA.org.  Newspaper Association of America, “Total Paid Circulation: Number of 
Daily Newspapers.”  http://www.naa.org/TrendsandNumbers/Total-Paid-Circulation.aspx. The total number of 
daily newspaper numbers shrunk in every sample period, from 1,676 in 1985 to 1,408 in 2008, a 16 percent 
decline.   
16
 Cook, Phillip, Douglas Gomery and Lawrence Lichty.  The Future of News: Television-Newspapers-Wire 
Services-News Magazines.  Washington, D.C.: The Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1992: 146.  In 1960, 70.1 
percent of daily newspapers subscribed to one major wire service.  By 1985, that number rose to 85.7 percent.  
This corresponded to an increase in supplemental wire use. 
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of the products that full-service wires provide, instead advocating only occasional, a la carte 
national and international news to augment a community-centered core.17   
 Returns from the sample indicate that this idea is still gestating, though efforts at 
increased localism are being made in both newsrooms.  Even as overall local reporting failed 
to displace wire dependence, locally-generated material grew as a relative percentage of 
overall Section A news hole.  From 2000 to 2008, Fayetteville’s local Section A story 
volume grew from 12 percent to 19 percent.  “Over the past five to ten years, we’ve made a 
definite editorial move towards making The Observer more of a local newspaper,” Mike 
Arnholt, Executive Editor of The Fayetteville Observer, said.  Meanwhile, Charlotte’s local 
growth was more deliberate, climbed from 14.5 percent to 15.8 percent of Section A from 
2005 to 2008.    
 Ownership structures and available resources may begin to explain the disparity in the 
relative growth of local reporting between the two papers.  The Broadwell-owned-and-
operated Fayetteville Publishing Company supplies a rare, direct relationship between local 
family ownership and local coverage in a smaller market, as compared to the corporately-
owned Charlotte Observer.18  “Charlotte would often do its own statewide stories, whereas 
we have much more of a southeastern regional focus to our newspaper and have devoted 
most of our staff accordingly,” Broadwell said.  Charlotte enjoys instant access to 
McClatchy-Tribune Information Services.  Furthermore, in a larger metro area, Charlotte still 
                                                          
17
 Meyer, Phillip.  “The Elite Newspaper of the Future.”  American Journalism Review.  Oct.-Nov. 2008.  
<http://www.ajr.org/Article.asp?id=4605>.  “I still believe that a newspaper’s most important product, the 
product lease vulnerable to substitution, is community influence.  It gains this influence by being the trusted 
source for locally-produced news, analysis and investigative reporting about public affairs….Newspapers might 
have a chance if they can meet that need by holding on to the kind of content that gives them their natural 
community influence.  To keep the resources for doing that, they will have to jettison the frivolous items in the 
content buffet.” 
18
 The Fayetteville Observer is one of four remaining locally-owned daily newspapers in North Carolina.  The 
other three are the Dunn Daily Record, the Goldsboro News-Argus, and the Washington Daily News. 
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sees aggregation as a central part of its mission.  “We still have to be an aggregator of sorts 
because the bulk of our core readers are not as Internet savvy as you might think,” Charlotte 
Observer National Editor Rich Mathieson said.  “A lot of them do still rely on us to be the 
paper of record.”  
 In both dailies, however, local story volume still lagged well behind the AP.19  
Although the papers belonged to only one full-service news provider – the AP – and retreated 
in their use of supplementals, local reporting did not threaten to displace wire content.  This 
is partially resource-driven, but also a byproduct of traditional print philosophy, espousing 
that Section A is like a storefront inviting customers inside to shop its many departments, all 
the while offering them a gateway to the nation and the world.  Charlotte and Fayetteville, 
while deliberating over a move to a more locally-intensive Section A, are yet to make that 
conversion, consistent with their tried-and-tested beliefs about the purpose of the section and 
their interpretations of what their individual markets demand.  “Some papers have made that 
change, where they’ve said, ‘Our front porch is now going to be all local because that’s the 
only thing that distinguishes us,’” Broadwell said.  “I think, given our crazy market (a 
military community drawn up around Fort Bragg), it makes sense to carry the international 
wires that we do because it reflects part of who we are.”  “There’s still a core mission to be 
done, and I think you saw that with the [Presidential] election of 2008,” Mathieson said.  
“People couldn’t get enough of that and were very engaged and letting us know that they 
wanted to read this.”    
Results suggest that those resources funneled into staff reporting at both dailies 
directly targeted community matters over state and regional news, underscoring a focus on 
                                                          
19
 In Fayetteville, the 2008 sample still revealed an AP-local story ratio of 71 to 18.  In Charlotte, the AP-local 
split was 73 to 21. 
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bolstering “community influence” at the hyper-local level.20  The coding protocol performed 
a surface-level content analysis of locally-staffed stories, partitioning them geographically.  
Any articles on events, issues or people in the city, surrounding towns and suburbs or the 
county at-large were classified as “local.”21  Categories for “state” and “national” stories 
were also created.  In Fayetteville, “local” stories comprised the bulk of locally-reported 
content.  Of the 102 locally-staffed stories in the Fayetteville sample, 87 were “local” – an 85 
percent clip.  “Local” coverage increased by 36 percent from 2000 to 2008.  Charlotte also 
went “local,” but not to the same extent as Fayetteville.  Of the 126 locally-reported stories 
coded, 66 were “local.”  That 53 percent clip easily outpaced all other local categories but 
was well below Fayetteville’s total.  “Local” coverage increased by 62 percent from 1995 to 
2008.  
Again, Charlotte, with its bigger staff and commitment to more general aggregation, 
covered a greater expanse of North Carolina.  This largely explains why Fayetteville leaned 
on the AP for a portion of its Section A state coverage, while Charlotte depended exclusively 
on its own staff to cover the state for the front section.  “With Charlotte and Raleigh, it’s 
more of a prestige thing traditionally, that ‘we’re a statewide newspaper, we look out for 
everybody,’” Broadwell said.  As such, resources were drawn out over a wider coverage area, 
though they still centered on Charlotte and Mecklenburg County first and foremost.  
 Charlotte and Fayetteville also mirrored each other in how they pushed locally-
reported content to the front page in order to usher readers into Section A, and then the rest 
of the newspaper.   
                                                          
20
 Meyer, supra note 17. 
21
 For Fayetteville, all Fort Bragg-related stories were deemed “local.” 
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• Charlotte published 76 percent of its locally-reported content on page one.  Those 
stories constituted 51 percent of cumulative front page material.   
• Fayetteville went even further, with 80 percent of its locally-staffed articles reaching 
the front.  Staff stories constituted the greatest percentage of front-page material, 48 
percent, though that ratio finished behind Charlotte.   
The utilization of locally-generated reporting on the front page strengthened 
throughout the sample as both made strong efforts to create a “front-porch effect” through 
their local content, positioning it prominently to entice readers to come inside, even if the rest 
of Section A did not necessarily carry out the pattern.22  Even though both dailies relied 
heavily on wires for national and international news, they predominantly used these services 
“after the jump” to fill in substantial gaps around staff coverage that consistently headlined 
the front.23  “Readers can get national and world anywhere they want it, anytime they want 
it,” Broadwell said.  “You get the local only here.  It’s our franchise.  So that’s why the move 
in that direction.”  
   
Analysis/Speculation/Conclusions 
This study, focusing on Associated Press usage patterns by two North Carolina 
dailies, underscores the ills afflicting the print industry.  With rare exceptions, newspapers 
are shrinking – both in their overall numbers and their news hole.  In Charlotte and 
                                                          
22
 Fayetteville grew the percentage of locally-staffed content on its front page in each coded year, hitting 62 
percent in 2005 and then 64 percent in 2008.  Charlotte followed the trend, with locally-produced content 
reaching 56 percent in 1990, then gradually rising to 58 percent in 2005.  It leveled off at a strong 57 percent 
clip in 2008.  Also, in both markets the overall front page story count steadily declined over the sample.  Not 
only did more local reports get pushed to center stage, but their presence on the front incurred less wire 
dilution.   
23
  In Charlotte, only six percent of all AP stories appeared on page one.  That represented just 10 percent of 
total front-page coverage.  Fayetteville gave 11 percent of its AP articles front-page treatment, constituting 41 
percent of total front-page coverage. 
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Fayetteville, Section A coverage is not as robust as it once was.  Consequently, AP usage is 
stalled or falling.  “Papers are smaller, even than they were in 2008,” Charlotte Observer 
Editor Rick Thames said.  “As a result, we’re using less wire generally.”  Charlotte and 
Fayetteville find themselves hastily re-imagining their vision for serving their communities’ 
needs more pointedly, but limited resources curtail the ability to fully deliver on that vision at 
the pace and scale that the market demands.  As a result, to borrow a phrase from economist 
Michael Porter, they find themselves “stuck in the middle.”24  “We get readers who say, ‘we 
want more local news from you; we can get other news from the Internet and TV,’” 
Mathieson said.  “When you start pulling away that stuff, [then] they start saying, ‘why don’t 
we have a regional-worthy newspaper?’  You get this real split.”  Generally, newspapers 
have tightened Section A and incrementally moved toward localization while holding out 
hope that economic and industry forces will turn.   
The prospect of an industry-wide migration to localism portends a murky future for 
the AP.  For those whose primary purpose becomes to talk to every resident, cover every 
town-hall meeting and turn over every stone in the local community, then sweeping news 
wires like AP fail to offer value that meets that mission.  This identity shift necessitates that 
newspapers re-consider the essentialness of AP’s value pledge.   
As this analysis suggests, AP currently maintains a prominent, albeit waning, 
presence in the front news section of mid-to-large-circulation papers.  Extensive interviews 
with editors and publishers at 12 news organizations also indicate that sports and business 
agate remain essential, too.  Even in states such as Ohio and Maine, where robust regional 
news-sharing arrangements have sprouted (see Chapter 2: “Sharing to Survive: OHNO and 
                                                          
24
 Porter, Michael.  Competitive Strategy: Creating and Sustaining Superior Performance.  New York, NY: The 
Free Press, 1985: 16-17. 
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Emerging Internal Threats to AP’s Core Foundations”),25 these daily newspapers continue to 
subscribe to AP to receive what they consider the essential feeds – breaking news, as well as 
agate and the news digest.  However, as budgets erode, local franchising gathers momentum, 
and competitive alternatives proliferate, newspapers are performing cost-versus-use 
comparisons to reevaluate their financial relationship with AP.26   
Among the questions front-and-center: How truly unique and indispensable is the 
value that AP’s products and services provide?  How does this deduction reconcile with the 
costs of participation in the cooperative?  And finally, how do AP’s mission and business 
goals line up with the changing mission and goals of its members?  Across the country, 
editors and publishers are taking steps to address these questions, with substitutes being 
sought that minimize, or nullify entirely, the need for the cooperative.  Several have banded 
together and looked to each other for answers.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
25
 Ricchiardi, Sherry.  “Share and Share Alike.”  American Journalism Review.  Feb.-March 2009: 2.  
<http://www.ajr.org/Article.asp?id=4685>.  See also http://www.onthemedia.org/transcripts/2008/04/25/04. 
26
 Hau, supra note 2. 
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Table A: The Fayetteville Observer Coding/Content Analysis Results Table 
 
 
Year 
Coded 
AP 
Front-
Page 
Stories 
Wire 
Front-
Page 
Stories 
Locally-
Reported 
Front-
Page 
Stories 
AP 
Section 
A 
Total 
Stories 
Wire 
Section 
A 
Total 
Stories 
Locally-
Reporte
d Section 
A Stories 
AP 
Story 
Conten
t 
Analysi
s 
Locally-
Reported 
Story 
Content 
Analysis 
Total 
Section A 
Story 
Count 
1985 15 10 6 79  
(13.2 
per 
coded 
issue) 
41  
(6.8 per 
coded 
issue) 
14  
(2.3 per 
coded 
issue) 
30 Natl/ 
28 
State/ 
21 Intl 
10 Local/ 
3 State/ 
1 Natl 
134 
1990 16 0 
 
 
 
 
18 107 
(17.8 
per 
coded 
issue) 
3  
(0.5 per 
coded 
issue) 
24  
(4.0 per 
coded 
issue) 
65 Natl/ 
39 Intl/ 
3 State 
21 Local/ 
3 State 
134 
1995 10 5 15 80  
(13.3 
per 
coded 
issue) 
12  
(2.0 per 
coded 
issue) 
16  
(2.7 per 
coded 
issue) 
54 Natl/ 
24 Intl/ 
2 State 
14 Local/ 
1 State/ 
1 Natl 
108 
2000 13 0 13 87  
(14.5 
per 
coded 
issue) 
7  
(1.2 per 
coded 
issue) 
13  
(2.2 per 
coded 
issue) 
50 Natl/ 
35 Intl/ 
2 State 
11 Local/ 
1 State/ 
1 Natl 
107 
2005 9 1 16 71  
(11.8 
per 
coded 
issue) 
4  
(0.7 per 
coded 
issue) 
17  
(2.8 per 
coded 
issue) 
37 Natl/ 
32 Intl/ 
2 State 
15 Local/ 
2 State 
92 
2008 7 1 14 71  
(11.8 
per 
coded 
issue) 
4  
(0.7 per 
coded 
issue) 
18  
(3.0 per 
coded 
issue) 
43 Natl/ 
28 Intl 
16 Local/ 
2 State 
93 
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Table B: The Fayetteville Observer Data Synthesis 
Coding Sample Totals: 
- AP Front-Page Stories: 70 Stories/11.7 per coded year 
- “Other Wire” Front-Page Stories: 17 Stories/2.8 per coded year 
- Locally-Reported Front-Page Stories: 82 Stories/13.7 per coded year 
- AP Section A Total Stories: 495 Stories/82.5 per coded year 
- “Other Wire” Section A Total Stories: 71 Stories/11.8 per coded year 
- Locally-Reported Section A Total Stories: 102 Stories/17.0 per coded year 
- AP Story Content Analysis: 279 National Stories/46.5 per coded year…179 International 
Stories/29.8 per coded year…37 State Stories/6.2 per coded year (28 of 37, or 75%, in 1985) 
- Locally-Reported Story Content Analysis: 87 Local Stories/14.5 per coded year…        
12 State Stories/2.0 per coded year…3 National Stories/0.5 per coded year 
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Table C: Charlotte Observer Coding/Content Analysis Results Table 
 
 
 
 
Year 
Coded 
AP 
Front-
Page 
Stories 
Wire 
Front-
Page 
Stories 
Locally-
Reported 
Front-
Page 
Stories 
AP 
Section 
A 
Total 
Stories 
Wire 
Section 
A 
Total 
Stories 
Locally-
Reported 
Section 
A Total 
Stories  
AP 
Story 
Content 
Analysis 
Locally-
Reported 
Story 
Content 
Analysis 
Total 
Section 
A 
Story 
Count 
1985 7 20 13 43  
(7.2 per 
coded 
issue)  
65 
(10.8 
per 
coded 
issue) 
18  
(2.9 per 
coded 
issue) 
27 Natl/ 
16 Intl 
12 Local/  
3 State/ 
3 Natl 
126 
1990 2 14 20 44  
(7.3 per 
coded 
issue) 
 
48  
(8.0 per 
coded 
issue) 
23 
(3.8 per 
coded 
issue) 
28 Natl/ 
16 Intl 
12 Local/ 
6 State/ 
5 Natl 
115 
1995 3 12 19 44  
(7.3 per 
coded 
issue) 
35  
(5.8 per 
coded 
issue) 
26  
(4.3 per 
coded 
issue) 
28 Natl/ 
16 Intl 
12 Natl/ 
9 State/ 
5 Local 
105 
2000 1 11 16 57  
(9.5 per 
coded 
issue) 
39  
(6.5 per 
coded 
issue) 
22  
(3.7 per 
coded 
issue) 
30 Natl/ 
27 Intl 
12 Local/ 
7 Natl/ 
3 State  
118 
2005 3 8 15 54  
(9.0 per 
coded 
issue) 
40  
(6.7 per 
coded 
issue) 
16  
(2.7 per 
coded 
issue) 
28 Natl/ 
26 Intl 
12 Local/ 
2 State/ 
2 Natl 
110 
2008 3 7 13 73 
(12.2 
per 
coded 
issue) 
39  
(6.5 per 
coded 
issue) 
21 
(3.5 per 
coded 
issue) 
39 Natl/ 
34 Intl 
13 Local/ 
4 State/ 
4 Natl 
133 
59 
 
Table D: Charlotte Observer Data Synthesis 
Coding Sample Totals: 
- AP Front-Page Stories: 19 Stories/3.2 per coded year/0.53 per coded issue 
- “Other Wire” Front-Page Stories: 72 Stories/12.0 per coded year/2.0 per coded issue 
- Locally-Reported Front-Page Stories: 96 Stories/6.0 per coded year/2.67 per coded issue 
- AP Section A Total Stories: 315 Stories/52.5 per coded year/8.75 per coded issue 
- “Other Wire” Section A Total Stories: 266 Stories/44.3 per coded year/7.4 per coded 
issue 
- Locally-Reported Section A Total Stories: 126 Stories/21.0 per coded year/3.5 per coded 
issue 
- AP Story Content Analysis: 180 National Stories/30.0 per coded year/5.0 per coded 
issue…135 International Stories/22.5 per coded year/3.75 per coded issue…0 State Stories            
- Locally-Reported Story Content Analysis: 66 Local Stories/11.0 per coded year/1.83 per 
coded issue…33 National Stories/5.5 per coded year/0.92 per coded issue…27 State Stories/ 
4.5 per coded year/0.75 per coded issue
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3 
 
Sharing to Survive: OHNO and Emerging Internal Threats to AP’s Core Foundations 
 
“In my opinion, AP ‘Lite’ is too ‘lite,’ and AP Complete is too complete.  The choice came 
down to the lesser of two undesirable deals.  They have a take it or leave it attitude.  
Unfortunately, most newspapers have no choice but to take it – as is.” 
- Ron Royhab, retired Toledo Blade Editor 
 
Part I: OHNO Sets the Precedent 
On November 29, 2007, editing teams representing the largest daily newspapers in 
Ohio converged on the Columbus Dispatch’s downtown news headquarters, the clicking of 
keyboards and whir of printing presses providing the soundtrack to their assembly.  Soon, 
another sound – one of change – would hum unmistakably.      
At the suggestion of Dispatch Publisher John Wolf, they gathered to mull an idea that 
heretofore ran afoul of the prideful independence and competitive zeal that formed their 
essence – sharing.   
“Everybody was laying off people, cutting news hole, these sorts of things,” Ron 
Royhab, then-Toledo Blade Editor, said.  “Bean counters were in control.  So we asked, 
‘How can we help each other?’” 
Several hours later, they adjourned with a fresh outlook on their editorial 
responsibility and a framework for a new way of conducting operations – the Ohio News 
Organization. 
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At the heart of this motion for change was the Associated Press, their time-honored 
news partner.  For Ohio editors, the cooperative had become a lightning rod that many 
harbored grievances against, principally the concern that a longtime comrade may be turning 
competitor.  In turn, with their news holes retracting and a renewing focus on local content 
franchises, they must weigh the robustness of AP’s value proposition against the prudence of 
retrenching from the wire.  
 
Biting the Hand That Always Fed 
Ohio’s misgivings with the AP assumed three primary forms: cost, credit, and, 
specific to the state news wire, timeliness.   
Subscribers to the full AP report invest handsomely for the brand’s reputation and 
global reach.  Royhab’s Toledo Blade, a mid-sized daily of 104,000 circulation, paid 
$538,000 in 2008.1  Rates increase as a function of circulation and total usage.2    
“As we were trying to hang onto our staff, when we saw the rates for AP being as 
high as they were, we found that untenable, even though AP had some things to keep costs 
relatively flat,” Columbus Dispatch Editor Benjamin Marrison said.  
Meanwhile, AP bylaws mandate that, as part of the unique cooperative structure, 
members must furnish “all news that is spontaneous in its origin,” for the cooperative to 
                                                          
1
 Royhab, Ron.  “Associated Press & OHNO Follow-Ups.”  Message to Jed Williams.  19 March 2010.  E-mail. 
2
 Hau, Louis.  “Down on the Wire.”  Forbes.com.  14 Feb. 2008.  “AP's fees currently average around $143,000 
per paper, but the actual amount a newspaper pays per year varies greatly from paper to paper, with the 
largest dailies paying well in excess of $1 million a year.”  See http://www.forbes.com/2008/02/13/media-
newspapers-ap-biz-media-cx_lh_0214ap.html. 
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collect and re-purpose.3  AP’s mode of attribution for these scraped-and-distributed stories 
failed to satisfy Ohio editors.                                   
“We were very frustrated that it doesn’t cost AP a penny to say ‘this story was 
reported by the Plain Dealer or the Blade or insert newspaper,’” Marrison said.  “But they 
routinely, as a matter of policy, would not.  They would put a tag line at the bottom that ‘this 
story came from paper x.’  That was inadequate to us.”     
Another hang-up was the timeline on which these stories appeared, a difference from 
the speed and efficiency of AP’s larger wires.  With AP state wires, “if we ran a story on 
Monday in print, the AP would pick it up Monday afternoon and make it available to other 
papers for Tuesday,” Marrison explained.  In industry parlance, state distribution was not “on 
cycle.” 
Spats over cost, credit, and convenience necessitated “a very vocal, animated 
discussion on the Associated Press” that directly conjoined to conversations of statewide 
sharing.  Though defection from AP was neither the stated mission nor the primary talking 
point, Marrison and his editing faction emerged from their initial session allured by the 
“thought that if we can somehow share content, maybe at some point down the road we 
wouldn’t need AP.”   
 
The Mechanics of Sharing 
Once consensus was established, the Ohio News Organization – or OHNO as it is 
commonly known – launched quickly.  A gentlemen’s agreement to share content was struck 
among Ohio’s eight largest dailies, each geographically dispersed across the state to 
                                                          
3
 Associated Press Charter and Bylaws: 1846-2008.  42
nd
 Edition.  Revised March 2008.  Article VII, Section 4: 
23. 
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minimize head-to-head friction.4  Within six to eight weeks, the daily news exchange took 
shape. 
Susan Goldberg, Editor of Cleveland’s Plain Dealer, the largest daily in Ohio, 
volunteered her own technologists to construct the Web site platform and database that 
would house content and enable story transfer.5  By March 2008, OHNO was in full swing.  
Contrary to what many newspaper editors suspected, OHNO’s suffered few hitches as 
a result of the fierce competitiveness that had demarcated them for decades.  “There is a very 
high level of trust,” Marrison said.  Trust anchored in a pragmatism that grew out of the very 
first meeting: that sharing was good for business.   
“We just talked about how illogical it was for six of us to send reporters to cover the 
Cleveland Indians-Seattle Mariners game and all write essentially similar stories,” Marrison 
said.  “Wouldn’t it make more sense if one or two of us went, and then the other papers could 
use the time of those reporters to write enterprise and share that?  We found that it made 
great sense.”  
The greater challenge was ingraining OHNO as a fixture within the working core of 
each news organization – not just in the executive suite.   
“It wasn’t a priority,” Marrison conceded.  “It wasn’t part of the normal process, and 
so sometimes it was forgotten.  But the editors were all very committed to making sure this 
thing worked, and we worked through it.”     
                                                          
4
 Marrison, Benjamin.  Editor, Columbus Dispatch.  Personal Interview.  3 Feb. 2010.  “We tried to represent 
the various regions of the state.  So if you were to take a map, Cleveland is northeast, Toledo is northwest, 
Cincinnati is the farthest southwest, Dayton is southern and west, we’re central but cover all of southeast 
Ohio, Youngstown is almost in Pennsylvania, and Akron and Canton are two major news centers and are good 
newspapers.” 
5
 The service was a basic login-secured file-transfer-protocol (FTP) site marked by its simplicity in uploading 
and accessing content. 
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While the organization was not bound by formal strictures – no contracts and no 
buyouts - its sharing protocol was clear-cut. 
“We agreed that you can hold back anything you want,” Marrison said.  “If a story 
was highly competitive, if it was something that another paper could match, you could hold it 
back.  If a story is up on the site, you can’t match it.  You either take it, or you wait a day.  
But it can’t be a tip sheet.” 
 
OHNO Challenges, AP Responds 
As OHNO gathered momentum, expanding its ambitions and reach, the tension 
between its members and the AP intensified. 
Shortly after the Ohio syndicate launched, the editors drafted a letter to corporate 
headquarters in New York voicing concern over the cooperative’s initial Member Choice rate 
structure,6 notably its bundling of products and services that the constituents denied needing.7  
Its contents gave voice to a host of newspaper executives around the country, who insisted 
upon “a cafeteria type of menu where we could pick what was important to us, what was 
not…and we wanted the rates to reflect that.”8   
In response, AP deployed then-Senior Vice President and Chief Revenue Officer Tom 
Brettingen to Ohio to meet with OHNO’s core leaders.   
                                                          
6
 AP.org.  “New AP pricing and packaging plan to take effect in 2009; AP Board approves ‘Member Choice,’ 
making more content available and easier to find.”  25 Oct. 2007  
<http://www.ap.org/pages/about/pressreleases/pr_102507a.html<http://www.ap.org/pages/about/pressrele
ases/pr_102507a.html>.  “With Member Choice, members will pay a basic assessment that gives them access 
to all AP state, national and international breaking news….For additional fees, members will be able to buy 
premium services featuring in-depth content in news analysis, business, sports, entertainment and lifestyles.”  
7
 Royhab, Ron.  Editor, Toledo Blade.  Personal Interview.  17 Feb. 2010.     
8
 Marrison, Personal Interview, supra note 4. 
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“We thought at least we could break the ice,” Royhab said.  “We had all sorts of 
concerns – rates, the way they handled our copy.  And what was shocking to us was that they 
blew us off.  They absolutely did.  My blood pressure goes up when I think of that meeting.  
It became an AP issue.” 
Enough so that Marrison openly expressed that the fissure “made us more resolved to 
make sure that OHNO succeeded.” 
Jim Kennedy, AP’s Vice President and Director of Strategic Planning, admitted the 
cooperative paid a price for its stubbornness.  “Even if we want to discount them (OHNO), 
you have to understand that it happened,” he said.  “We didn’t handle it all that well.  We had 
a marketing idea that said we’re going to give people more access and could price it 
differently.  That’s what we believed we could do, and we stuck with it.” 
Several months into a deep economic recession and imperiled by industry upheaval, 
most traditional media companies were unable to subscribe to the “more for more” business 
strategy that Kennedy described, a philosophy that first congealed when Tom Curley took the 
reins as CEO in March 2003.9  Under his leadership, the cooperative pushed to streamline 
workflow, increase member touch points, and create new revenue streams through diverse 
products and platforms.10   
“When we did all this, we didn’t figure on the industry collapsing,” Kennedy said.  
“Our business justification was that this would give us the opportunity to give multiple layers 
of access to the customer.  Then we had to finesse through two or three iterations until we 
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 “USA TODAY Publisher will become CEO of Associated Press.”   USA TODAY.  28 March 2003                             
<http://www.usatoday.com/money/media/2003-03-28-ap-curley_x.htm>. 
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 See http://www.unc.edu/~jedw/ap/.  Chief early initiatives included opening the first of four regional editing 
hubs in Atlanta, developing 1-2-3 filing protocol (now 0-1-2-3-4) that enabled more customized storytelling 
across an array of channels, and reaching an agreement with Google News for the leading search portal to 
carry AP stories and pictures. 
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finally got to ‘more for less’ and ‘less for less.’  We should have appreciated it when we first 
saw it and not fought it.  We learned a tough marketplace lesson there.”   
Realizing the error of its ways, AP reacted quickly, a move that even the inflamed 
OHNO members credit them for.  By April 2008, just three months after approval of the 
original Member Choice, Dean Singleton, Chairman of the AP’s Board of Directors, 
announced additional member savings.11  Even further rate reductions, plus a moratorium on 
increases for any member, were passed that October.  At that time, it also promised “a 
complete review of its pricing and governance structure,” including an examination of the 
two-year cancelation notice that had long been a staple of membership.12  Ultimately, it was 
scaled back to one year.  The amended Member Choice platform offered constituents tiered 
subscription options at Complete and Limited levels.  It also afforded them greater levels of 
customization and flexibility in their wire service, as they could buy into content verticals 
that served specific needs, albeit not the pure a la carte buffet many yearned for.13                                                                                                                             
“My sense is that AP nationally gets it,” Marrison said.14  “They lowered the rates.  
They did go around and interview newspaper editors all across the country, and asked them 
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 AP.org.  “AP announces formation of the Mobile News Network and further cost reductions for member 
newspapers.”  14 April 2008  < http://www.ap.org/pages/about/pressreleases/pr_041408a.html>.  “The not-
for-profit news cooperative…announced a deeper reduction in its newspaper members’ basic service 
assessments for 2009, totaling up to $21 million – or 10 percent of their total AP service fees.” 
12
 AP.org.  “AP Board approves further rate reductions; AP to undertake review of membership structure.”  23 
Oct. 2008  <http://www.ap.org/pages/about/pressreleases/pr_102308a.html>.  The AP reduced member 
assessments by an additional $9 million for 2009. 
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 AP.org.  “Remarks by Dean Singleton.”  6 April 2009.  
<http://www.ap.org/pages/about/pressreleases/pr_040609c.html>.  “Once you've chosen one of these two 
services, you can tailor Member Choice to suit your needs. For example, Complete customers can opt out of 
certain text news categories — and further reduce their rates. Limited customers can upgrade their service by 
adding one or more of the categories, which include Sports, Money & Markets and Lifestyles.” 
14
 Marrison, Benjamin.  “AP/OHNO Follow-Ups.”  Message to Jed Williams.  E-mail.  9 March 2010.   
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what they wanted, then altered their Member Choice program.  It didn’t go as far as we 
wanted, but it was huge in terms of the change for AP.”15 
Kennedy and his cohort acknowledged their failure to recognize the destructive 
market and industry forces that undermined their business advancement initiatives.  
However, he also cautioned against those who continue to use price structure as the vehicle 
to define their relationship with – and vent their frustration towards – the AP.   
“The whole deal about the price war has sort of settled out because we reduced the 
price,” Kennedy said.  “We gave them ‘more for less,’ and we gave them ‘less for less,’ and 
that pretty much solved the problem.  Ohio’s still out there holding the banner because they 
brought it out in the first place, so they’re continuing to be the standard bearer for a 
movement that really isn’t there anymore.”    
“Some of that is posturing on the part of these newspapers,” Charles Broadwell, 
President and Publisher of The Fayetteville Observer, said.  “I think there’s some of that.  
‘Well, we’ve got to be mad at somebody, but we don’t know what to do without ‘em.’  It’s 
like a family squabble.” 
 
Shared Success 
Now more than two years old, OHNO has flourished on many fronts.   
For one, the competitive instinct that pitted newspapers against each other for 
generations has been balanced by the transparency and trust that must exist for a news-
sharing platform to function.  In fact, the majority of the eight participating dailies have 
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 The latest iteration of Member Choice saved Cleveland over $300,000 off of its previous bill.
15
  Toledo 
preserved $153,000,
15
 while Columbus pocketed $150,000.  
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expanded the number of stories they avail to the point of essentially posting their entire 
“news budget” for that day.16   
The most dramatic breakthrough occurred when multiple OHNO partners began 
collaborating on enterprise projects that historically had been the tightly-fortressed franchise 
of each independent paper and the fuel igniting their competitive zeal. 
During the 2008 Presidential election, in which Ohio was a prominent swing state, 
OHNO embarked on collective statewide polling, splitting costs among the members based 
on circulation.  The polls reached millions across the state and earned high marks.  The 
newspapers then partnered on a series of analysis pieces about the polls, with a different daily 
writing the lead and the other members contributing sidebars.  OHNO recently signed up to 
conduct four new polls for the 2010 state elections. 
Marrison cited another example of how mutualism has enabled the Ohio dailies to 
creatively bolster their news-gathering operations and agenda-setting ability. 
“When the swine flu was running rampant, [Plain Dealer Editor] Susan Goldberg 
talked to the head of the Cleveland Clinic, and he was genuinely concerned about people not 
taking this seriously.  So we (OHNO) met as a group, and it was suggested, ‘why don’t we, 
on one day, do “flu Sunday?”’  We each took different pieces of it.  We put together a plan 
for how to cover this, and then we all shared the content.  And on that day, all across the 
state, people fully understood how H1N1 works and how it gets stopped.  It was hugely 
successful.” 
 
The Bottom Line for OHNO 
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 According to Marrison, if an editor is looking for a story in another market that is not tagged to the OHNO 
database, “you just call that paper and say, ‘hey, I saw in your budget that you have this story.  Could you post 
it?’  And we will.”   
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OHNO was formed expressly as a costless cooperative that relies on the labor, 
loyalty, and empathy of fellow members to run smoothly.  Though the organization adheres 
to firm sharing rules, its loose association of partners, fluidly linked through the free flow of 
information, still has a “handshake feel” to it…and purposely so.   
“We’ve tried not to become AP,” Marrison said.  “We’re trying to do the best we can 
to serve our readers.  We believe in the call of journalism.  I don’t think [sales] is what this is 
about.” 
With newspapers battered by the secular displacement of the premium print 
advertising and geographically-and-financially-protected barriers that long sustained their 
competitive advantage, OHNO executives yield that a ubiquitous question must be asked: 
can they afford not to consider the revenue-generating possibilities of their creation, as 
improbable as some may seem?  
Marrison recalled one Ohio newspaper outside of OHNO, as well as a single radio 
station, contacting the organization to inquire about buying the service.  The eight editors 
convened and decided that “we don’t want to go there now.  We just want to focus on doing a 
good job with what we have.”   
A second conceivable revenue producer would involve the Plain Dealer, which built 
the FTP site on which OHNO operates, selling the platform as a proprietary system for other 
organizations to use. 
“I haven't been involved in any serious conversations like that,” Goldberg wrote in an 
e-mail.  “I have trouble imagining that working for general news content about Ohio. It is 
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possible that it could work for very specific content niches, perhaps for politics or sports, but 
I'm not really sure.”17 
Again, Marrison insists that “our mission is as simple as doing right by our readers.”  
But can Ohio’s leading newspapers, or broadsheets across the country for that matter, deliver 
on that core democratic promise as the income supporting it recedes? 
Royhab, a quintessential newsman by training,18 accepts that without requisite 
revenue feeding back into and funding the news process, newspapers will struggle to 
maintain their signature community influence.19  To paraphrase his earlier analogy, only 
when the cycle turns will the bean counters loosen their grip and the journalists take hold.   
“It was brought up, if we could sell OHNO and make some money,” he said.  “I don’t 
think that was completely taken off the table, never to be brought up again.  I hope it does 
come up again.  But [with OHNO] I think there could be contractual issues.”20 
Financial quandaries and contractual snafus aside, Marrison remains bullish on the 
long-term growth trajectory of statewide sharing. 
“Long term, this is the future,” Marrison said, extolling OHNO’s influence.  And I 
think this is the future elsewhere in the nation.”  
 
Part II: Sharing Becomes a Maine Priority 
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A full decade before OHNO, Rex Rhoades and Mark Woodward were already 
sharing.  
The editors of Maine’s Lewiston Sun Journal and Bangor Daily News respectively, 
Rhoades and Woodward had begun to forecast the radical repercussions that mainstream 
Internet saturation could wreak on their industry.  So, as early as 1998, while most 
newspapers were lapping up hefty profits and investing little in online strategy to equip 
themselves for the swirling digital revolution, two small northeastern dailies were battening 
down to protect their assets.21   
“We all want to break that big story, but for the most part, day-to-day, we don’t 
compete with each other,” Woodward, who retired in December 2009, said.  “Here’s a way 
to share some resources.” 
“Bangor and Lewiston went ahead, but only with a verbal agreement to share 
content,” Rhoades said.  “If we thought they were covering something interesting, or we saw 
something on their Web site, we would call and request it for our paper.  They did the same.  
This probably happened a handful of times each week.” 
The loftier ambitions of statewide sharing, however, were shelved when the three 
southernmost dailies – the Augusta Kennebec Journal, the Portland Press Herald/Maine 
Sunday Telegram, and the Waterville Morning Sentinel – rebuffed the idea out of fear of 
encroaching upon the AP.     
“Fast forward ten years, and this thing in Ohio (OHNO) pops up,” Rhoades recalled.  
“Lo and behold, the chain of newspapers to the south had changed hands.  I get a call from 
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 Meyer, supra note 18, at 39.  “Before technology began to create alternate toll routes, a monopoly 
newspaper in a medium-sized market could command a margin of 20 to 40 percent.” 
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one of their editors, who says, ‘I always thought this was a pretty good idea.  Why don’t we 
get together and talk about it again?’”   
The meeting was set, and within weeks, a sharing agreement between five of the 
seven dailies in Maine was struck.22   
On September 20, 2008, the quintet published a story headlined “Five Maine Daily 
Newspapers Announce Sharing Agreement” to promote the forthcoming news exchange.23  
Within the article, important tenets of the state cooperative were highlighted.  Initially, only 
three to four stories each day would be shared by the partners, with the hope that it would 
grow organically over time.  Editors emphasized that sharing would not extend into 
enterprise domains, “particularly investigative pieces and other articles from the few regions 
where the newspapers compete.”24  Finally, Kennebec Journal executive editor Eric Conrad 
foreshadowed a future in which “Maine AP news will be less valuable as we grow.”25 
 
Maine and OHNO: Similar, but Not the Same 
 Whereas in Ohio issues of attribution and timeliness were seminal sources of unrest 
with AP, in Maine, competitive concerns with local radio and TV wire subscribers were 
paramount.   
 “What always galled me was that I would get up early in the morning and listen to 
Maine Public Radio, and this guy would have re-writes of all the stories out of all the 
newspapers in the state,” Rhoades described.  “He would read them on the air, and everybody 
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would think he was absolutely the hardest-working newsman today.  When, in effect, 
newspapers were collecting all these stories for him, and those stories weren’t even in my 
newspaper.” 
Maine and Ohio also differed on matters of scope.  While not at “OHNO level,” 
where entire daily news budgets are posted, cooperative efforts in Maine have more than 
doubled to eight to ten stories per day per paper.  “Almost without exception, I think the 
newspapers share their best stuff,” Rhoades said.  “Honestly, we try to look at it and say, 
‘what would be of the most use to the other newspapers?’”   
However, still true to the original mission statement, collective enterprise reporting of 
the ilk of OHNO’s H1N1 expose remains largely unchartered territory.  And with only five 
newspapers partaking, most of them diminutive compared to Ohio’s major metros, 
summoning the wherewithal to execute such initiatives is more difficult.  Above all else, 
though, the flames of competition still burn brightly. 
“I can tell you I’ve been a little more reticent to do it with some of our more involved, 
enterprise work,” Bangor Daily News editor Michael Dowd, who replaced Woodward 
effective January 1, 2010, said.  “We’ve certainly done everything breaking on cycle.  It’s 
when you get into investigative and other efforts that we might block.”  
 
Money to Be Made? 
As for the omnipresent revenue question, the irksome “one-way street” perception of 
local radio and TV stations’ greedily grabbing whatever they choose from AP without 
reciprocating original content is central to why the Maine cooperative is not exploring ways 
to sell it. 
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“I think it’s more valuable from a competitive standpoint for the newspapers to have 
the content rather than sell it to TV or radio stations, which would just expose it to readers 
before they can get the newspaper.  Maybe we should think about that, but it doesn’t seem 
lucrative to me right off the bat.” 
Perhaps it never will be.  But Dowd, who has entertained ideas internally about the 
exchange’s profit potential, believes they can’t afford not to probe every imaginable 
monetary channel.   
“We’re not sure if it’s going to have legs or not,” he said.  “But in this time for our 
industry, every paper is looking at how they might monetize content and exploring 
everything they possibly think of.  We’re certainly doing that.” 
 
Part III: Coast to Coast Collaboration: The Emergence of McClatchy Regional News 
Ohio set the trend, and Maine was a close disciple.  Over the past two years, similar 
state news exchanges have popped up from the tip of Florida to the top of Texas, from New 
Hampshire through Maryland and into the Carolinas,26 reinforcing Marrison’s confidence in 
the concept’s scalability.27   
On January 1, 2010, the Los Angeles Times-Washington Post News Service 
dissolved.  The Post joined forces with Bloomberg to create a new wire, while the Times – 
owned by the Tribune Company – paired up with The McClatchy Company to form 
McClatchy-Tribune Information Services, or MCT.  McClatchy Regional News grew out of 
the newly-merged national service, providing a direct, real-time feed of state newspaper 
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content across several categories, including news, business, and sports.  Recent Web site 
searches revealed multiple story postings from dailies as large as Charlotte, Greensboro and 
Fayetteville to those as small as Burlington and Hickory.  Mike Arnholt, Executive Editor of 
The Fayetteville Observer, described this unedited, non-boiled down platform as being 
locked at the hip with the MCT’s national wire.  “Subscribing to the McClatchy Tribune wire 
brings that directly into our front-end system,” Arnholt explained.  “We’re a subscriber to 
one, and [automatically] a member of the other.”28 
 
AP & McClatchy Regional News: Value Comparisons  
Feedback to McClatchy Regional News has been mixed, hinging largely on how AP 
members evaluate the kind and quality of the content that AP delivers as compared to the 
new alternative.   
“AP takes our stuff, re-writes it, and boils it down to a news story,” Arnholt said.  
“But with McClatchy, the whole story is from everyone.  So you get a nice feature story 
about a barbeque restaurant in Wilson that’s the whole thing.  “You probably wouldn’t see 
that on AP.  With McClatchy, it’s whatever they had in their paper.” 
Then again, as Kennedy defends, running stories in full from member outlets is not 
the declared purpose of the cooperative, nor does it necessarily serve the needs of members 
far removed, yet within the same state. 
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“One of the values that we’ve always produced is that we turn local contributions into 
the homogenized milk of the AP,” he said.  “So a statewide story is not going to be written as 
if it were angled toward a certain parochial readership.”29 
Broadwell affirmed the value that Kennedy described as a principal motive why the 
AP – even in its most embattled moments – presents a value proposition that, for most 
members, is irresistible.   
“You go back to the AP’s strengths, and one of those is consistency of style and 
format,” he said.  “The AP is that Bible, versus with McClatchy Regional, we get 37 
members with different styles and formats.” 
McClatchy Regional News’ usage varies from market to market.  Fayetteville is 
active in both feeding and pulling from the state service.  “With McClatchy’s footprint in the 
Carolinas, that’s been a huge development,” Broadwell said.30  “Suddenly we’re seeing more 
state stories there than from AP,” Arnholt interjected.   
Meanwhile, for the Charlotte Observer, a McClatchy-owned paper no less, the need 
is minimal.  “We haven’t used the separate tier of MCT for North Carolina so much because 
we have North Carolina AP, and more importantly, we use a lot of material from the Raleigh 
News & Observer,” Charlotte Observer Front Page Editor John Arwood said.31 
 
Part IV: Breaking Free or Holding On? 
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 See Ricchiardi, supra note 25.  “In 2006, the state’s two largest and most competitive dailies (both 
McClatchy-owned papers) merged their capital bureaus and sports staffs and began running each other’s top 
investigative reports.” 
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The ultimate analysis of state news exchanges’ effects on the need for the AP in 
newspaper members’ pages harkens back to a fundamental value equation: investment versus 
return.   
These organic arrangements have re-ordered the value paradigm in one central area: 
state news.  Delivering real-time breaking news on cycle to only those within the protected 
organization, and thus shielded from external competition, the partnerships offer a service 
that the AP state wire is yet to match.  The result is a dramatic decline in AP state reports in 
the newspaper. 
“We don’t use very much Ohio AP anymore,” Marrison said.  “They still have good 
reporters who still churn out good enterprise pieces that we will use.  But, day-to-day, we 
don’t use as much AP on our state news pages because we’re getting it directly from the 
originating source.” 
“The greatest success (of the state news exchange) I think is that what used to be 
filled with wire is now high-quality, in-state content that hopefully makes us a more 
attractive product,” Dowd said.   
Now, members of such organizations must reconcile these benefits against a 
pervasive question: are they sufficient to sever ties with AP entirely? 
 
AP’s Irresistible Value 
For all the bluster about AP’s burdensome rates and declining value, few legacy 
members have filed for cancelation32…and fewer still have actually gone through it.  None of 
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 The Chicago Tribune and the New York Daily News announced that they plan to cancel their AP membership 
in 2010.  See http://www.unc.edu/~jedw/ap/.  
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the 12 newspapers profiled in this study canceled, and only one – Maine’s Lewiston Sun 
Journal – filed the papers, only to later retract.33   
“There are some that filed cancelations to signal their displeasure with AP, I think,” 
Charlotte Observer editor Rick Thames said.  “We didn’t think that was a step we had to 
take.  There are things we want from AP.” 
When asked why they haven’t yet signed off the service, editors and publishers, 
seemingly in concert, highlight the same unique content verticals and unmatched news-
gathering-and-delivery practices.  Content falls into three distinct buckets: breaking news, 
sports and sports agate, and business agate.  Quality of the overall report centers on speed 
and strength of voice.  
With over 3,000 journalists employed in 243 bureaus worldwide,34 requiring a $500 
million budget to sustain at current operating levels,35 the AP enjoys a time-honored 
reputation as the signature wire service for breaking news.  This brand is further fortified as 
struggling metro dailies shutter international bureaus and consolidate national desks in order 
to cut costs.36 
“I believe that their breaking news performance and their international performance 
are still their champions in lots of ways,” Charlotte Observer Managing Editor Cheryl 
Carpenter said. 
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  “Twice we’ve had cancelation notices into them,” Rhoades said.  “We were looking, as other newspapers 
were, for alternatives to the AP.  But we’re in good graces now.”  
34
 Consolidated Financial Statements: The Associated Press and Subsidiaries, Years ended December 31, 2009 
and 2007.”  <http://www.ap.org/annual09/media/APFinancials08.pdf>. 
35
 Kennedy, Jim.  “Newsgathering.”  Message to Jed Williams.  E-mail.  25 Feb. 2010.   
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 The Boston Globe, for instance, closed its final three international bureaus – Berlin, Bogota, and Jerusalem – 
in January 2007.   
<http://www.boston.com/business/articles/2007/01/24/globe_to_close_last_three_foreign_bureaus/>. 
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AP’s hallmark is breaking news, but the category that the greatest number of local 
editors said they could not function without was sports, primarily the agate page – scores and 
standings for professional sports and major colleges.37  This has been an AP specialty for 
decades, and to hear local editors and publishers tell it, no competitor is even in the same 
ballpark. 
“It’s the most comprehensive, timely, dependable source of everything sports-related 
for newspapers,” Rhoades said.  “AP just has the national network to do it.  Maybe ESPN 
will start a service someday, but there is no substitute if a newspaper our size feels like they 
need it for their readership.” 
As OHNO editors pondered a future without AP, they could not escape the fact that 
they did not have an adequate answer for sports, especially agate.  But they are on the market 
for one.  
“They have a lot of sports content that would be very hard to replicate because 
they’ve had this system for many, many years,” Marrison said.  “There’s a national sports 
content-sharing arrangement (National Sports Content Sharing Network) that we’re going to 
be joining soon that’s modeled after OHNO.  It’s OHNO nationally on sports.  The agate part 
of it we still don’t have a solution for.” 
Business agate – formerly stock listings, now re-packaged as a “money and markets” 
paginated spread – similarly safeguards AP against competition and defection.  Even with a 
well-etched footprint in the Carolinas, most major McClatchy dailies in the region – 
Charlotte, Columbia, Myrtle Beach, and Rock Hill – bundle the “money and markets” report 
with their tiered subscription.   
                                                          
37
 Subscribers receive a prescribed level of sports as part of their tiered service, but can opt into a full sports 
report that includes additional stories and agate.   
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AP’s broader brand advantages lie not only in what it delivers, but how it delivers it.  
The service is built for speed, but couples being first with a zealous commitment to being 
right.  That combination is difficult to match.  “When something is developing rapidly, no 
one can touch AP with the speed of their updates,” Arwood said.  Meanwhile, its ferocious 
dedication to accuracy is stated unequivocally in the bylaws, which assure that “the news 
gathered and distributed by the Associated Press shall be as objective and complete as human 
endeavor can make it.”38  
  
AP Reports, Members Decide 
A popular reaction by those within state news cooperatives, in conjunction with AP’s 
speedy restructuring of its Member Choice platform, has been to drop down a tier from AP 
Complete to Limited.  Often members will scale back to Limited, then bundle in several 
category-specific supplementals.39   
The Charlotte Observer, for instance, recently opted for Limited but paired it with 
News Analysis, Money and Markets, and Sports.  The Columbus Dispatch also selected 
Limited.  With the number of supplementary services his newspaper was compelled to 
purchase, however, Marrison said the Dispatch essentially still feels like the Complete 
member it was for decades.   
“How they grouped the content made it difficult to go to AP Limited,” he said.  “We 
just keep adding these things back, and you get to the point where you might as well just buy 
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 Associated Press Charter and Bylaws, supra note 3, Article 1: 4.   
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 “One of the things that AP says, which makes sense from a marketing perspective, is that you can take AP 
Limited as you’re figuring out your budgets and upsell by buying into the Complete package at any time during 
the year,” Charlotte Observer National Editor Rich Mathieson said.  “But you cannot, however, start with the 
full package and then downgrade.” 
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the whole thing.  We went with ‘AP Lite’ and added Sports and Lifestyles.  They are very 
smart with how they put it together.”  
The fruits of this creative bundling were that “they had a higher proportion of the 
membership sign up for Complete than they were anticipating when they went to the tiered 
selections,” Paul Tash, an AP Board member and Chairman of Times Publishing Company in 
St. Petersburg, Florida, said.40 
For those who chose Limited, the move has not only elicited frustration from editors 
like Marrison, but has induced anxiety in the newsroom over what might be sacrificed.  First 
and foremost, they circle AP’s full news digest and newsroom alerts as crucial.  As Limited 
members, news organizations not only receive far fewer breaking news stories, but they also 
lose access to the newsroom bulletins that can motivate and organize coverage. 
“They’re crucial, especially on deadline,” Carpenter said.  “We are really concerned 
about not getting the news alerts,” Arwood conceded.   
Kennedy accentuated the foundational importance of the AP’s newsroom report as a 
compass that guides the daily news cycle. 
“When you look at print, you only see part of what the value proposition is,” he said.  
“If you back off from the ‘product level’ to the ‘radar level,’ the newsroom value of the AP 
report is hugely important…more important than ever.  It becomes even more important 
because how are you going to reconstruct that?  Are you going to look at a bunch of 
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 As an example, the Blade renewed at the Complete tier.  “In my opinion, ‘AP Lite’ is too lite, and AP 
Complete is too complete,” Royhab said.  “In this case, the choice came down to the lesser of two undesirable 
deals. They have a take it or leave it attitude. Unfortunately, most newspapers have no choice but to take it – 
as is.” 
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bloggers?  Are you going to pull up Global Voices41 and see what’s going around?  I don’t 
think so.”   
Thames was incensed by the AP’s decision to eliminate newsroom alerts for Limited 
partners and suggested that the move could backfire if the Charlotte Observer can identify 
substitute services.   
“Their not sending us news alerts as part of the Limited package is, in my opinion, 
almost anti-journalism,” he said.  “With a Limited model, I’m seeing attributes that will lead 
us to be actually less dependent on them.  We’re finding other ways to get alerts.42  We’ll 
find another source for that story because we don’t know that other story’s coming.  They’re 
actually shoving us farther away.” 
Kennedy’s defense: AP gave members what they clamored for. 
  “Give the customer choice,” he said.  Let them feel like they’re saving a buck 
somewhere along the line instead of making them do it.  There’s still complete fairness 
across the board on pricing, so if you buy this one thing, it’s going to be based on your size, 
but you’re going to have more things to pick.” 
Furthermore, the cooperative can no longer afford to shoot its products down generic 
pipes, accessible in mass to members, subscribers, licensees, and the Internet at large (see 
Chapter 3: “Mobile, Gateway, and the Reimagining of the AP Business Model”).  The net 
effect is the devaluation of the products that the AP is working to differentiate in order to 
imbue them with more value for users, and in turn, create more profitable demand.   
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 GlobalVoicesOnline.org describes itself as “a community of more than 200 bloggers around the world who 
work together to bring you translations and reports from blogs and citizen media everywhere.”  
42
 “We’ll have to start relying on more things like Twitter,” Charlotte Observer National Editor Rich Mathieson 
said.  “I can’t tell you the number of stories that have broken first on Twitter before AP even came close.”  
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Walter Hussman, CEO of Wehco Media, Inc. and Publisher of the Arkansas Democrat-
Gazette, Chattanooga Times Free Press, and Texarkana Gazette, has long bemoaned what he 
perceives as the commoditizing effect AP has on its own products and brand.   
“In our market (Little Rock), for instance, AP will sell their content to the local 
business weekly.  That’s 6,000 circulation.  Our daily circulation is 170,000.  They take the 
Arkansas wire and put it up on their Web site for free.  Well, if you sell it to a weekly, and 
they turn around and put it up there for free, it’s been commoditized…so it’s not as valuable 
to newspapers at it used to be.” 
AP Limited is one such attempt at value preservation. 
“We do thousands of stories in the course of a day,” Kennedy said.  “We take 
thousands of pictures, and we do hundreds of video clips, and we’re going to have to now 
package those into discrete products to create the new value we’re talking about.  That’s 
going to be a big change, both for our customers and the consumer.” 
What the AP strives to deliver in return is a multi-layered value proposition. Kennedy 
trumpeted that this pledge extends well beyond the printed product.43  It begins with the real-
time newsroom compass, includes print, and extends online as well.  Opinions on the import 
of AP’s Internet value proposition diverge in some cases, depending on how sacred the 
organization deems its local content franchise to be online.    
“The AP contributes a great deal to our Web site, getting its own module near the top 
of dispatch.com,” Marrison said.  “The AP has always been good at breaking news, and the 
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 Kennedy, Jim.  Vice President and Director of Strategic Planning, Associated Press.  Personal Interview.  15 
Feb. 2010.  “Because AP used to play so prevalently in the paper, and members used so much of it in print, the 
value of AP over the decades was associated with how much play is out instead of what the newsroom is 
actually looking at.  We didn’t ever really push that as a part of the value proposition.  It was always an 
assumed part.” 
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Internet allows this strength to shine.  AP’s web value is high, and a major reason we have 
continued with AP.”44 
“For the most part, we downplay national news,” Mathieson said.  “In terms of the 
front page of the website, our news producers don’t do a whole lot with AP except when it’s 
a major story.  People just don’t turn to Charlotte.com to read about news in Istanbul.” 
 
Part V: Conclusion 
In the ongoing tug-of-war over value – as affiliates in Ohio, Maine and beyond 
desperately seek to foster their own and minimize their financial reliance on others – AP is 
attempting to re-conceptualize its core to deliver members timely content and timeless value.  
The fourth, and newest, prong of AP’s value pledge encompasses an integrated new-platform 
strategy that symbolizes a new mode of doing business – partnering with members as a 
revenue creator.   
“It’s really an all-purpose business partner that provides you with everything from the 
eyes and ears and global news report all the way out to new business opportunities that you 
can choose to participate in,” Kennedy said.  “That’s the new AP value proposition that’s 
going to start resonating.” 
For the business plan to resonate, the cooperative must answer several vital 
marketplace questions.  What can AP do to facilitate acceptance by beleaguered members, 
many of whom still feel an underlying tension with their national partner?  Will the new 
model generate tangible revenue for participating partners?  Most saliently, to borrow 
Kennedy’s words, will it be enough “to get everybody over the mountain” while also 
sustaining the cooperative itself? 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
The Gateway to AP’s Re-Imagined Business Model 
 
“The biggest hurdle we have to overcome is getting people comfortable with the idea of an 
aggregated product sell, and pushing that as a primary source of revenue.  The industry has 
cooperated on things, but most have been around cost containment or shared coverage.  
There has never been a large-scale shared business initiative that’s really taken shape.” 
- Jim Kennedy, Vice President & Director of Strategic Planning, AP  
“I very much admire and appreciate the ambition and the thoughtfulness behind [AP’s] 
initiatives.  I’m just not sure if news organizations with so many other initiatives will have 
the time or energy to really focus on these things.  That doesn’t necessarily speak to their 
value, but it does speak to the challenges AP faces around getting people to pay attention at a 
time when their attention is already very, very scattered.” 
- Stephen Buckley, Managing Editor, St. Petersburg Times 
 
Seeing the Future 
In his 16th floor office at corporate headquarters on West 33rd Street in New York, 
Jim Kennedy, AP’s Vice President and Director of Strategic Planning, points to his window 
sill and declares, “this is the new model.”   
There sits a piece of cardstock, about 2x3 feet in size, entitled “Web 3.0 Business 
Model.”  On this simple four-quadrant matrix, the horizontal axis scrolls from “Packaged” to 
“Atomized,” while the vertical axis climbs from “Free” to “Paid.”  It represents past and 
present iterations of the online business model, with a hypothetical design for the future.  
And it is the future – in the upper right Atomized/Paid square – where Kennedy fixes his 
gaze (see Appendix D: “Web 2.0 Business Model”). 
“As you look at this, it revives the business,” he proclaims.   
86 
 
“It” symbolizes a digital movement that transcends traditional web search – the 
instrument that has dominated the digital domain for almost a decade – into a new frontier 
shaped by portability that portends new user experiences through heightened convenience 
and customization. 
Kennedy recognizes the necessity of a transformation.  Not only could it trigger a 
renaissance for beleaguered traditional media, specifically newspapers, battered by the gales 
of “creative destruction,” but it could offer the AP a renewed industry stronghold by 
empowering a more dynamic and irresistible value proposition to its members.1  To 
capitalize, the cooperative must map a new way of doing business, both among its 
constituents and in the general marketplace.  This enterprise will require AP to 
metamorphose from a pure content creator and vendor into a revenue-producing partner, 
even as digital news operations fight more competitors for fewer dollars and are forced to re-
deploy resources accordingly. 
“The digital space is a much smaller cost and revenue environment than the old 
environment was,” Kennedy said.  “You’ll see the news business change to one that, I hope, 
is driven by innovation, but one that acknowledges the fact that revenue will build slowly 
from a much smaller base, and that costs will have to be reduced to compensate for that.”     
Sizeable impediments stand between AP and its ability to stimulate such change.  Can 
member tension be sufficiently suppressed to engage an active constituent audience?  
Assuming they listen, will they actually comprehend?  Even if the answers are “yes,” can 
these organizations, with their squeezed newsrooms and pinched budgets, plausibly entertain 
                                                          
1
 Foster, Richard and Sarah Kaplan.  Creative Destruction: Why Companies That Are Built to Last Underperform 
the Market – and How to Successfully Transform Them.  New York, NY: Currency Doubleday, 2001: 9-10.  See 
also Schumpeter, Joseph A.  Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy.  New York, NY: Harper, 1942.  “Creative 
destruction” generally refers to the process of transformation that accompanies radical innovation. 
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participation in an unproven platform?  Will the new opportunities introduced by portability 
prompt AP to provide the a la carte services that members clamor for in order to boost its 
value proposition?  How would this influence AP’s bottom line, and thus its ability to 
generate the $500 million required annually to sustain the international workforce that has 
made it “the essential global news network?”2  Finally, rather than merely telling them, how 
can AP show members the indispensable value in its new model – driven by revenue creation 
– that would invigorate their businesses? 
 
From Surfing to Searching to the “Splinternet” 
To appreciate how the AP came to embrace its vision for rebirth, Kennedy stressed 
that one must understand how legacy media burrowed the hole in the first place.  All that is 
required is scanning the lines on the matrix: first a period of paid, packaged content pushed 
by creators onto consumers, then an explosion of online options that largely defeated the 
ability to charge by skewing the supply-and-demand curve, and finally the ubiquitous 
emergence of web search.  Colloquially, this is called “the Google era.”  
With paid search advertising driving 99 percent of Google’s total revenue – $23.6 
billion in 2009 alone – the California colossus eclipsed $180 billion in market capitalization,3 
captured over 63 percent of market share in search (85 billion U.S. searches last year),4 and 
even became a popular verb (“googled”).   
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 Kennedy, Jim.  “Newsgathering.”  Message to Jed Williams.  E-mail.  25 Feb. 2010.   
3
 See http://www.google.com/finance?q=GOOG.  
4
 Schonfeld, Eric.  “Google Gobbled Up 90 Percent of all U.S. Search Growth in 2008.”  TechCrunch.com.  28 
Jan. 2009  <http://techcrunch.com/2009/01/28/google-gobbled-up-90-percent-of-all-us-search-growth-in-
2008/>. 
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Traditional news operations were left stammering in its wake, a byproduct of the 
“cultural lock-in”5 afflicting their mental models6 and the technological advances 
undercutting their market advantages.7  Many pegged Google’s disruption and reinvention of 
the Internet as so traumatic that longstanding news gatekeepers – their budgets burdened by 
fixed costs and their geographic monopolies shattered – would never win significant market 
share or tap healthy revenue from their online content.  Meanwhile, their heritage print 
franchises were fading.   
For that reason, the upper right corner of Kennedy’s matrix – the future – remained 
blank for many years.  His “moment of ah-ha” arrived after reading a 2009 report from 
Forrester Research that forecast the digital fragmentation of information beyond the confines 
of the conventional web and into a new, portable realm termed the “Splinternet.”8 (see 
Appendix C: “Internet/’Splinternet’ Platform Characteristics Chart”). 
“It really set up the ‘post-search era,’” Kennedy said.  “It basically said that we’re 
going into an era that is not totally visible to search, and so therefore will not be contained by 
that opportunity.  And yet it’s still universal, democratic, open, and personal.” 
The portability revolution that Forrester articulated germinated with the rapid 
adoption of smartphones, beginning in 2007 and accelerating annually.9  It broadened to 
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 Foster and Kaplan, supra note 1, at 16. 
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 Id. at 18.  
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  Kennedy, Jim.  Vice President and Director of Strategic Planning, Associated Press.  Personal Interview.  15 
Feb. 2010.  “The news companies struggled because the economy went into the tank, and news companies 
decided to stick to their knitting and didn’t invest in innovation, particularly on the Web because the Web was 
over with at that point.  It came storming back three or four years later with ad support, and by that time they 
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in the ballgame.” 
8
 Bernoff, Josh.  “The Splinternet means the end of the Web’s golden age.”  Forrester Research.  26 Jan. 2010          
<http://forrester.typepad.com/groundswell/2010/01/the-splinternet-means-the-end-of-the-webs-golden-
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9
 Walsh, Mark.  “Forrester: Smartphone U.S. Market Share Reaches 17%.”  MediaPost.com.  5 Jan. 2010  
<http://www.mediapost.com/publications/?fa=Articles.showArticle&art_aid=120085&nid=109540>. 
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encompass a host of electronic readers.10  Now, the movement has again morphed into a 
domain of all-purpose consumption devices, headlined by Apple’s recently-released iPad.11  
The rise of mobility has Kennedy dreaming of new horizons for the AP, ones in which it 
leads the charge to resuscitate the media’s hope for a vibrant future by innovating its way 
back into consumers’ consciences.   
“It’s like a gift from heaven,” he said. 
 
Planting the Seeds of Change 
Long before “portability” and “Splinternet” became popular currency, AP had already 
re-imagined itself as a more nimble cooperative.  Upon his installation as CEO in March 
2003,12 Tom Curley quickly embraced “the change demon.”13  His diagnosis: AP must re-
organize its own processes to better serve the specific needs of its stakeholders and must 
ready itself to buffet the waves of destruction crashing down upon the industry.   Innovation 
would be paramount, namely creating a business infrastructure that enabled AP to go directly 
to market with products that meet the rapidly-changing needs of members and consumers 
alike.   
This multi-planked, integrated strategy – “tag, track, and package” – sought to 
synergize business and technology while re-conceptualizing AP’s value proposition to 
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 Amazon’s Kindle has gained the most acclaim among e-readers, with Barnes and Noble, Sony, The Hearst 
Corporation and others debuting their own models.  Most offer books, magazines, newspapers and other 
forms of content on demand, as well as basic web browsing capability. 
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 Stone, Brad.  “With iPad Tablet, Apple Blurs Line Between Devices.”  The New York Times.  27 Jan. 2010   
<http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/28/technology/companies/28apple.html>.  Tablets such as iPad are 
smaller than laptop computers, larger than smartphones, and are controlled by multi-touch human gestures, 
and thus place the full vitality of the Internet directly in users’ hands.   
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 “USA TODAY Publisher will become CEO of Associated Press.”   USA TODAY.  28 March 2003                                 
<http://www.usatoday.com/money/media/2003-03-28-ap-curley_x.htm>.  
13
 See http://www.unc.edu/~jedw/ap/.  Tom Curley Video: “Lessons Learned from USA Today.” 
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members as not solely a content provider, but a revenue partner – a stark change in business 
philosophy.   
“The biggest hurdle we have to overcome going forward is getting people 
comfortable with the idea of an aggregated product sell, and really pushing that as a primary 
source of revenue,” Kennedy said.  “The industry has cooperated in things, but most of those 
have been around cost containment or shared coverage.  There has never been a large-scale 
shared business initiative that’s really taken shape.” 
Before the first plank – tagging content with rich metadata to be tracked and later 
packaged – could be laid, AP executives saw a desperate need to build a multimedia 
database, an initiative termed EAP.14  “Up to that point in 2003, all of our content was 
created and sent out in separate systems,” Kennedy explained.  “So text in one, photos in 
another, audio in another, video in another.  They all went into different black boxes in the 
customer shop.”   
These ponderous processes impaired AP journalists’ ability to streamline storytelling 
and created prohibitive inefficiencies for members.  EAP provided new sightlines for 
reporters.  It also shifted the cooperative away from “pushing” content through isolated 
pipes, instead enabling members to “pull” exactly what they need as they need it.15   
By late 2007, with the multimedia database fully functional, AP prepared to set the 
first plank in its integrated campaign.  Ultimately, the Digital Cooperative sought “to find 
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 See http://www.ap.org/apexchange/.  EAP was later renamed AP Exchange, “a powerful online tool” 
allowing “speedy, precise and targeted retrieval of the information that matters most so you can get the news 
to your audiences on thousands of different topics.”  AP initially incurred a write-down with its multimedia 
database.  It renewed the initiative in 2005 and launched EAP in full in 2006. 
15
 “Every person in our core membership – every single editor, writer, and photographer – has a user name 
and password,” Kennedy said.  “So they can each set up the view of the database according to what they want 
to see.”   
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new digital outlets and revenue streams” for AP’s partners.16  Initially, it called for amassing 
all content, both AP and member, into a common hub to be marked with granular, 
standardized metadata, commonly referred to as “data about data.”17  The effort, which 
would lay the groundwork for newspapers to track the usage of their material and more easily 
link to related content, was greeted with indifference. 
“We came to them with a proposition that we would do this, and we would do it for 
free,” Kennedy said.  “And we got no takers.  Free wasn’t good enough.”  So we said, ‘let’s 
give them a cost incentive.’  We agreed to give them a five percent discount in their overall 
assessment for the AP if they got in the program.  And abracadabra, they all signed up.” 
Member content is ingested into AP’s database, tagged, and indexed by geography, 
source, author, category, and famous names.  Metadata mark-up allows for local outlets 
utilizing the service to automate links to related material, facilitating fuller, more focused use 
of the AP’s content trove.18   
 
Tracking Use and Cracking Down on Misuse: Building a News Registry 
With standardized tagging in place, the AP readied the second plank in its integrated 
strategy: a News Registry that would use the universal metadata applied in the Digital 
Cooperative to follow content through its entire online consumption cycle.   
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 See http://www.ap.org/digitalcoop/index.html.    
17 See http://www.niso.org/publications/press/UnderstandingMetadata.pdf.  Metadata is structured 
information that describes, explains, locates, or otherwise makes it easier to retrieve, use, or manage an 
information resource.  
18 Jon Rust, an AP Board member and Publisher of the Southeast Missourian, illustrates how this process 
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those related topics for us automatically throughout our Web site.  It drives about 80 percent of our related 
topic story views.” 
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The Registry, announced in July 2009, is currently being beta tested by more than 200 
newspapers in hopes of opening it up to the membership at large by third quarter 2010.19  
Ideally, it would furnish two services.  First, the platform would provide a real-time content-
tracking mechanism, showcasing the who, what, where, and how of consumption.  This data 
can then be leveraged to build out content that is more precisely targeted to user preferences, 
thereby delivering valuable consumer metrics to advertisers.  
“We’re tagging individual assets – sub-page levels, down to the headline level – and 
we can follow usage of and clicks on each distinct asset, instead of just the overall page,” 
Kennedy explained.  “So if somebody clicks on a page and consumes different parts of the 
content and uses it differently, we can follow that.  It’s a real-time dashboard, and you can 
see what’s happening to your content,” Kennedy said.  “I think people will really embrace 
that.”   
Second, it would cede a measure of control back to original content creators in their 
fight to identify and punish misappropriators…previously a blind and often futile game of 
chase.  The Registry would chart licensed content usage while also conceivably creating a 
chilling effect on potential violators.     
As has been the case historically, AP’s stiffest challenge may not be sculpting the 
technological infrastructure, but communicating a cogent message that constituents can 
understand and are motivated to implement.   
The News Registry’s principal purpose has already been oft misconstrued.  While 
Kennedy champions the dashboard that will allow AP to follow the flow of members’ 
content, providing them data services around usage trends, public discussion harp on 
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 See http://www.apiowa.org/2010/03/more-than-200-papers-signed-up-to-beta-test-ap%e2%80%99s-news-
registry/.  
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protection.20  The maelstrom of attention around “cops and robbers” deflects focus away 
from how the Registry purports to offer a fundamental online business infrastructure for 
news organizations – particularly smaller, regional outlets – that has been conspicuously 
absent for years.  Paul Tash, an AP Board member and Chairman of the Times Publishing 
Company in St. Petersburg, Fla., reflects common industry sentiment in his interpretation of 
how the Registry could bolster his enterprise. 
“I think it’s potentially very important in terms or realizing the value of our work, not 
so much from individual users, but restricting the channels about how individual users can 
get to that work and therefore participate in any revenue that lies along those channels,” he 
said. “It means that other people can’t steal your stuff and steal advertising against it.” 
“We’re not getting the message across,” Kennedy conceded.  “People understand the 
registry to be all about chasing the bad guys.  That’s the way we allowed that message to be 
framed because it was the obvious point of argument.” 
If told correctly, the story heralds promise for both the cooperative and its members.  
For local affiliates, Kennedy promotes that the Registry could offer “the real basis 
for…[setting] up the wherewithal to do business [online], instead of just shooting out the 
content and hoping for the best.”  Concurrently, according to Jon Rust, an AP Board member 
and Publisher of the Southeast Missourian, “from the view of the AP, there is huge value to 
be able to do data analysis of how people are using content…if it can work at partnership 
level on helping [members] become smarter on how people are using it.”  
 
 
                                                          
20
 See Singel, Ryan.  “AP Doesn’t Know Its Protection Tech Doesn’t Protect.”  Wired.com.  27 July 2009  
<http://www.wired.com/epicenter/2009/07/ap-doesnt-know-its-protection-tech-doesnt-protect/>. 
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“Going Mobile”  
The architecture that the Digital Cooperative erected and the subsequent tracking 
mechanism that the News Registry provided paved the way for the culminating initiative – 
AP Gateway, a catch-all platform created to guide AP and its members collectively into the 
redefined digital marketplace.  
In May 2008, before AP formally unveiled Gateway (see “Opening a Gateway to the 
Portable, Digital Frontier”: 98), it launched its first initiative in multimedia product 
development within the Cooperative with the release of Mobile News Network, an 
application for wireless devices that offered an aggregated hub for smart phone owners to 
access content from local news brands as well as AP’s trusted reports. 
“Members can participate by providing local news that will appear alongside their 
logos, [and] importantly, the network also offers a new outlet for members to sell local 
advertising to a mobile audience,” Curley said in the official release.21 
Business rules for advertising were drawn such that local members would receive 
commission based on sales.  They would then reap supplemental revenue shares tied to usage 
and impressions – how many people accessed the stories and/or the ads on their pages. 
Currently, the Mobile News Network enlists over 1,000 contributing news 
organizations, predominantly local newspapers, but also radio and TV stations.  Most 
                                                          
21
 “AP announces formation of the Mobile News Network and further cost reductions for member 
newspapers.”  AP.org.  14 April 2008  <http://www.ap.org/pages/about/pressreleases/pr_041408a.html>. 
End-users insert zip codes to stream local content from that specific geographic area directly to their 
Blackberry, iPhone, or Palm Pre.  As an example, a Charlotte resident can input the zip code 28202 and see a 
constantly-updated news feed from the Charlotte Observer and other outlets within the area.  Nationally, 
consumers specify which feeds, by category, they wish to receive and can update preferences at any time.  AP 
offers 16 different content categories on its Mobile News application.   
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signature media brands participate, with a few notable outliers.22  One of those, The New 
York Times, has carried the flag for outlets who agonize over the competitive ramifications of 
sharing their local reporting with a mobile aggregator. 
Kennedy recalled some asking, “’Do I really want to be on the Mobile News 
Network?’  I already have a mobile site.  Do I really want to subvert my brand to the AP?’  
We tried to say, ‘look, you can still have your own mobile website for deeper dives, but this 
is the single-touch application, so you ought to be on that one.’”   
At first blush, participation statistics are robust.  Members’ level of actual 
engagement with the platform, though, suggests that understanding and connection are only 
marginal.  Several sampled news organizations are enrolled and funnel content to the mobile 
hub, yet interviews with their executive teams showed little comprehension of Mobile News’ 
stated purposes and potential deliverables.  Overheard in newsrooms across the country: “I 
draw a blank; I’ve heard of it.”  “Honestly, we have never seen that as anything but their 
vehicle, not ours.”  “That’s the problem – we’re already giving it away on our website as it 
is.”23 
Local advertising is yet to take hold.  Not a single news organization surveyed sells 
significantly against the content it streams through Mobile News.  Furthermore, none have 
teams dedicated to selling it, and few earmark any marketing resources whatsoever, a 
symptom of several colliding forces.  
                                                          
22
 See http://www.ap.org/mobile/contributors.html.  In North Carolina, 36 different news organizations are 
listed as Mobile News contributors.  Among daily newspapers, the only exception is the Greensboro News 
Record.  No radio or TV stations are listed.      
23
 Charlotte Observer Editor Rick Thames, Columbus Dispatch Editor Benjamin Marrison, and retired Toledo 
Blade Editor Ron Royhab were quoted. 
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Foremost among them, newsrooms are sapped of the wherewithal required to engage 
in new research and development, their staffs too taxed to shoulder another commitment.24  
“We’re scrambling so much,” Charles Broadwell, President and Publisher of The Fayetteville 
Observer, said, making it implausible to fully consider the merits and potential rewards of 
Mobile News.   
In Charlotte, Observer Editor Rick Thames lamented that his sales force is wholly 
unable to market Mobile News, even if it wanted to.  “I’ve heard it passed around as jargon, 
but no one came here and gave a demonstration and said, ‘this is something you’ve got.’”  
Stephen Buckley, Managing Editor at the St. Petersburg Times, recalled that there 
was “a broad-brush presentation that included bits and pieces about Mobile News, AP 
Exchange initiatives, and a couple of other things.  There was no talk that I remember about 
selling ads.  And if there was, it was very perfunctory.” 
Then there is the macro matter of the mobile market itself, where consumption is 
skyrocketing but advertising struggles to keep pace.25  “It’s really hard to sell ads on iPhone 
applications right now,” Walter Hussman, CEO of Wehco Media, Inc. and Publisher of the 
Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, Chattanooga Times Free Press, and Texarkana Gazette, said.  
“Maybe someday there will be more advertising, and I hope there is.  But right now there 
isn’t much.”26 
                                                          
24
 In Bangor, Maine, the Daily News has not yet organized a mobile approach.  In Fayetteville, The Observer’s 
mobile strategy consists of a one-man army designing the site – m.fayobserver.com – in his basement, 
literally. 
25
 See http://blogs.forrester.com/shar_vanboskirk/10-03-03-mobile_really_big_deal.  See also 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303338304575156073394630854.html.  “The mobile-ad 
market, despite much hype, has been slow to live up to expectations.  Spending on mobile ads in the U.S. 
reached just $416 million in 2009—up from $320 million in 2008—according to market-research firm 
eMarketer.” 
26
 Hussman’s doubts about the mobile market echo concerns he has about advertising across the entire digital 
space.  “Take ads on the Internet.  You go out and sell them at six dollars a thousand (CPM rate).  You take a 
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“It really surprised me,” Kennedy admitted.  “I thought that two years into it, we’d be 
into that stage.  But the local market for mobile isn’t there….The locals have to become 
better equipped to sell local ads, period.  And then they have to make that mindset adjustment 
to be selling it to an aggregated product.”  
In the interim, as local members endure a quarter-to-quarter fight for air and the 
mobile market waits to fully boom, the AP has had no choice but to retrench and wait for the 
climate to warm.  “We’ve settled on trying to do the national ads as best we can for now,” 
Kennedy said.  “We have three people on a team dedicated to selling Mobile News.  We’re 
probably going to have a pretty healthy advertising group within a year or two based on this 
product.”     
Hussman’s confusion lies not with what the application is, but with the worrisome 
precedent AP sets for the members of the cooperative who have grown accustomed to buying 
into an exclusive business-to-business arrangement. 
“I thought that actually put the AP in the unusual position of being a retailer of news, 
whereas they’ve always maintained that they’re a wholesaler of news,” Hussman said.  “My 
question at the time was, ‘does this change the relationship?  Are you going to start being a 
retailer of news?’  And the answer was N-O.  No.  So I don’t know what that means.”   
For AP, the challenge is establishing a new framework that engenders a more direct 
connection with the changing news audience by collaborating with constituents on products 
that can be commercialized, then monetized.  It vehemently defends that this does not entail 
an overhaul of the cooperative system.  “The idea of going forward with our affiliates is the 
business model moving forward,” Kennedy said.   
                                                                                                                                                                                    
high school football game that you shoot video on, and you get 3,000 people to watch it.  That sounds like a 
lot of people to watch a high school football video.  Well, you get 18 dollars of revenue.”  
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Mobile News allowed AP to wade into the waters of change, or as Kennedy put it, “to 
get out there on a new platform.”  Now, Gateway takes a bolder plunge...and carries with it 
incumbent pressure to advance AP’s digital strategy beyond an experimental laboratory and 
across a threshold of demonstrated, substantial revenue production.   
  
Opening up a Gateway to the Portable, Digital Frontier  
On February 26, 2010 in Denver, Curley stood before the Colorado Press Association 
and introduced Gateway, the platform through which AP aspires to lead both the cooperative 
and members into the new digital space by empowering them to “deliver the right content to 
the right people at the right time.”27  Or, as Kennedy put it, “Gateway is going to be the 
mechanism for us to provide our content and member content to people who want to exploit 
it.” 
Ideally, Gateway fills out the remaining quadrant of Kennedy’s “Web 3.0 Business 
Model” matrix, offering AP and the industry as a whole a rare opportunity to redeem their 
past mistakes by delighting customers with convenience and customization far surpassing 
search.   
“Now we’re going into a different stage with different platforms and different ways to 
reach the consumers,” Kennedy said.  “There will be less need to search than there is to make 
a smart choice about what you want to get.” 
The disintermediation of search as the primary vehicle for news consumption is 
predicated on a fundamental assumption: that content, if dynamically packaged to capture 
user preferences, will command a price tag.  AP envisions the Registry providing detailed 
                                                          
27
 “AP CEO Tom Curley’s remarks to the Colorado Press Association.”  AP.org.  26 Feb. 2010  
<http://www.ap.org/pages/about/pressreleases/pr_022610b.html>.  See also 
http://www.ap.org/pages/about/pressreleases/pr_022610a.html.  
99 
 
usage metrics, with Gateway then delivering sharp, customized products built around that 
data and tailored to particular devices.  The result, completing the matrix, would be atomized 
content’s migration from free to paid.   
This runs contrary to PEW’s 2010 State of the News Media report,28 which indicates 
that 82 percent of online readers would abandon their favorite news site if it began 
charging.29  However, Kennedy is quick to distinguish simply charging for online content 
from creating a set of experiences so targeted, so convenient, and thus so desirable, that they 
inspire consumer demand supported by revenue.30   
“The technology isn’t in control,” he said.  “People are making smart choices about 
what they want to get, and the content providers are responding to those choices with real 
product development that has real money behind it.  We’re probably going to charge less for 
those services than what it costs for a newspaper subscription today.  But we’re going to 
charge for it.  And we’re going to hope that people will find value in it.  I’m convinced they 
will.” 
Before it is bundled for consumers, content freely dispersed across the Internet must 
first be lassoed, tucked behind pay walls or otherwise shielded from search crawlers.  Both 
the AP and its members have witnessed the commoditization of their content and dilution of 
their brands by impulsively feeding the web without protecting the inherent value in their 
                                                          
28
 See http://www.pewinternet.org/Reports/2010/The-economics-of-online-news.aspx?r=1>.  See also 
Kramer, Staci D. “Pew: Online News Users Don’t Want To Pay – Or Look At Ads.”  PaidContent.org.  15 March 
2010 <http://paidcontent.org/article/419-pew-online-news-users-dont-want-to-pay-or-look-at-ads/>. 
29
 See also Mutter, Alan.  “Only 2.4% subscribe at newspaper pay sites.”  Reflections of a Newsosaur.  11 Jan. 
2010  <http://newsosaur.blogspot.com/2010/01/only-24-subscribe-at-newspaper-pay.html>.  According to a 
ITZ/Belden study, “a puny 2.4% of print subscribers is the average number of people paying for online content 
at the handful of daily newspapers that have been bold enough to erect pay walls.” 
30
 See also Saba, Jennifer.  “Journalism Online: The Answer to the Paid-Content Question?”  
EditorandPublisher.com.  24 June 2009.  “According to an All Things Digital Conference survey conducted by 
Penn, Schoen & Berland Associates, 92% of respondents said they would be willing to pay something for 
online news.”  
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trademarks.  AP currently shoots out 500 to 600 stories online each day, with only limited 
remuneration from distribution deals with online search portals to show for it.     
Some newspapers have begun the transition to online pay models, first The Wall 
Street Journal, and now The New York Times, which will introduce a metered system by 
2011.31  If others join the movement en masse, with the AP sending a strong national 
message by dramatically reducing the volume of content it shovels to the Internet, then 
Kennedy can envision a time in which the content creators regain control from search 
engines and lift the curtain on a new act for journalism.32 
AP’s first such effort within Gateway targets the construction of digital applications 
“for several new devices that have been introduced or announced in recent weeks, including 
the Apple iPad.”33  The ultimate goal: to create platforms and products that the cooperative 
and its members can package to end users, often collectively, in a bundle surprising and 
delightful enough to induce payment.  The application becomes a revenue center to be split 
between the two parties.  AP harvests multiple streams: money from members who enlist AP 
to customize applications for them, as well as users who pay for AP platforms and content 
and advertisers who link their brands with them.   Constituents can then charge consumers 
                                                          
31
 Perez-Pena, Richard.  “The Time to Charge for Frequent Access to Its Web Site.”  The New York Times.  21 
Jan. 2010  <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/21/business/media/21times.html>. 
32 Kennedy offers the following example of how the online search experience could change.  “Somebody 
who’s in the oil and gas industry and is a subscriber to the Houston Chronicle signs up for an AP feed on the oil 
and gas industry…can’t find it, can’t put ‘oil and gas’ into a search box and get anything close to what it is,” he 
explained.  “It can give you ‘the oil rig blew up’ story.  But it can’t give you the other 50 stories that were on 
the oil and gas feed this morning because there were behind a pay wall or they’re on another product that’s 
not exposed to web search.  Then there’s a whole body of content, hundreds of stories by category and by 
entity, that is differentiated to different products.  That’s where we’re headed.”  
33
 “AP CEO Tom Curley remarks to the Colorado Press Association,” supra note 27. 
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directly and/or sell advertising as part of a revenue share against the content they offer 
through their platform.34 
As with the News Registry and Mobile News, AP’s most formidable challenge likely 
will not lay in the technology itself – iPad application development is well underway – but in 
enticing its members to take the journey with it.   
“You start at speech level with Curley,” Kennedy said.  “Then, as we go through 
2010 and begin to implement this stuff, we get out into the field and we start going back to 
the constituents, basically door-to-door, and selling the story.  The bureau chiefs will go back 
out and have state meetings.  They’ll have individual meetings.  Then at the macro level, 
we’ll be out there talking about the same stuff and telling the business story.” 
The pitch must address several vital issues.  Principally, for news organizations 
already “stretched to the gills”35, why should Gateway products arrest their attention from the 
daily challenges of survival?  
“I very much admire and appreciate the ambition and the thoughtfulness behind 
[AP’s] initiatives,” Buckley said.  “I’m just not sure if news organizations with so many 
other initiatives will have the time or energy to really focus on these things.  That doesn’t 
necessarily speak to their value, but it does speak to the challenges AP faces around getting 
people to pay attention at a time when their attention is already very, very scattered.”   
Persuading members to lend their ears only scratches the surface.  Deeper connection 
hinges on selling members on, as Kennedy harps, “the ultimate shift in the business model 
from a cooperative that was built around cost containment to a cooperative that’s built around 
                                                          
34
 “We’ll have different ways of charging for things,” Kennedy said.  “We may take a chunk out [from 
members] to provide the Gateway.  Or we might produce an iPad application and [ask them] to pay to be a 
part of it as an advertising revenue share.  I think the iPad application is going to be a subscription for the user 
to pay.” 
35
 Buckley, Stephen.  Managing Editor, St. Petersburg Times.  Personal Interview.  15 March 2010.   
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revenue.”  Not an easy sale, considering AP’s limited pedigree as a revenue engine.  “I don’t 
think it’s going to be a significant revenue partner for us,” Hussman said.  “They can be 
some supplemental revenue, but we look at it as really minor.”   
“From what I know, it’s a major challenge for them to come up with a model that 
they can take to us and say, ‘we can almost guarantee that this will be a revenue stream for 
you guys,’” Bangor (ME) Daily News Editor Dowd said.   
Others share a more hopeful, even optimistic outlook on AP’s prospective growth 
into a legitimate new revenue channel.   
“We do see opportunity,” Rust said.  “Working across the industry, there is a lot of 
potential in digital products, and the more we can work together, they more value we can 
extract for originators of content.  In this path, we think that AP is the key entity that can tie 
together the industry.” 
No one is building their business model around the AP just yet, though, as returning 
revenue to members has never been an integral part of AP’s value proposition.  “I never 
thought about them that way,” Broadwell said. 
Then, there are smoldering competitive tensions that must be allayed.  Harkening 
back to concerns voiced by state news-sharing organizations (see Chapter 2: “Sharing to 
Survive: OHNO and Emerging Internal Threats to AP’s Core Foundations”), there exists an 
underlying suspicion that AP is marketing new products to cater them to other buyers in 
order to build additional moneymaking pipelines for itself.36 
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 Kennedy, Jim.  “Follow-Ups.”  Message to Jed Williams.  E-mail.  25 Feb. 2010.  AP’s business partners now 
include diverse sources beyond newspapers.  According to its Vice President and Director of Strategic 
Planning, domestic print revenue accounts for 26 percent of AP’s total income, down from 50 percent in the 
mid-1980s.  International subscriptions total 21 percent of revenue, domestic broadcast 19, and digital 
licensing 17. 
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“Very often, it feels like I’m meeting a competitor,” Thames said.  “Some of these 
things that AP is building don’t feel like they’re actually helping me as much as they may be 
providing AP with a new revenue stream.” 
“They often remind me that most of their revenue doesn’t come from newspapers 
anymore; it comes from [other] businesses,” Charlotte Observer Managing Editor Cheryl 
Carpenter said.  “So I’m always reminded of where we are on their pecking order.”  
In some corners, Gateway has been greeted with the same competitive consternation 
conferred on Mobile News – that if members permit AP to engineer the portable platforms 
for their content to be aggregated, then willingly funnel that content through its central hub, 
might they be cannibalizing their own brands?  Rather than positioning themselves to 
capitalize on new consumption trends, could they instead be undercutting their ability to 
build their own distinct platforms, thereby pushing away the customers they covet?  Then 
again, Hussman hypothesizes that major metros with the greatest competitive anxiety may 
not be AP’s target audience anyway.   
“I think the AP looked at this and said, ‘if the iPad really gets to be popular, how 
many of the newspapers – especially the smaller newspapers – are going to have a specific 
application written for the iPad and spend thousands of dollars to do that?  Maybe we can 
write an application and go to these papers and say, ‘here’s an application that AP has written 
for you where you can put your news on there, we’ll put AP’s news on there, and we’ll give 
you a share of the revenue.’” 
For many, the thought of consolidating their mobile strategy through a platform 
hosted by a single entity could be attractive if it increases efficiencies within their news 
operations.  
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“It’s a leverage game on the technology side, Christian Hendricks, Vice President of 
Interactive Media at The McClatchy Company, said.  “Anyone who can provide tools that 
eliminate the redundancy of building it over and over and over again – that’s a win.” 
Finally, beyond questions of cannibalization and competition, Hussman again invokes 
the larger issue of the impact of AP taking its own content directly to end-users, as it has 
through Mobile News, on the cooperative’s fundamental business-to-business template.  
Tash, installed as a Board member in 2009, confirms that the AP’s standard b-to-b model 
could evolve, but not into the direct b-to-c retailer that Hussman suspects.  Instead, it could 
transition from “vendor” to “agent,” serving as an “umbrella for the members in developing a 
news website…where we all aggregate our work to achieve a scale in news that would be in 
the interest of both the AP and the individual members.” 
Building a model of such scale necessary to generate substantial income continues to 
inhibit the portable realm.   
“We know that the mobile space is going to take a while to develop at the national 
and at the local level,” Hendricks said.  “Last year you had a lot of funny money in there with 
people experimenting with it.  This year they’re saying, ‘wait a minute, what do we get for 
that?’” 
 
Putting It All Together 
Kennedy knows that to complete the matrix, and for the opportunities of the 
“Splinternet” to be seized, AP must offer a compelling answer to the “what do we get for 
that?” question that members will certainly ask about Gateway.   
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The challenges are multiple and complex: commanding their attention long enough to 
share AP’s vision for salvation, telling a captivating innovation story that animates member 
embrace, and then reimagining itself as an essential revenue partner.    
“Demonstrating it is the key,” Kennedy said.  “We have to demonstrate that these 
things have value.  We’re going to have to demonstrate that this stuff works and that it’s 
generating new revenue and a new connection to the audience.  2010 needs to be the business 
story.”  
As Dowd said, “It really has to be a ‘show me’ kind of conversation.”  
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER 5 
 
Conclusion 
AP’s enduring mission as “the essential global news network” has been to bring news 
from around the nation and the world to local news organizations’ front doorsteps, a fulcrum 
of its cooperative structure in which it serves as a content creator, distributor, and vendor of 
original and re-purposed member content.  As newspapers, and traditional media 
organizations across every medium, such as the two news organizations sampled here, are 
ravaged by the gales of “creative destruction,” they must make hard decisions about who 
they are and how they re-position to survive.  Almost all have tightened budgets, shedding 
costs and shrinking news hole to preserve resources.  Concurrently, many have begun an 
aggressive migration to a more localized brand that differentiates them from current and 
potential competition.  As this transformation occurs, the AP’s role grows increasingly 
murky.  With its presence in dailies on the decline, AP must ask itself, “what is the essential 
value it can still provide that satisfies the needs of its transitioning core”?, and “how can it re-
conceptualize its identity to connect to the new news mission of its longtime members?” 
Gateway aims to re-imagine AP’s business model, providing its members access to 
local content applications while also platforming AP’s original content by its global network 
of more than 3,000 reporters and editors in 243 bureaus. At a time of disruptive change, it 
positions the company as a direct revenue producer for its members, a departure from its 
heritage.  Enacting this change requires the evolution of its traditional cooperative structure 
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into an arrangement that still serves its members, but seeks to reinvent the wire for a digital 
age.  
The very essence of the economic principle of “creative destruction” articulates that 
existing businesses must reinvent themselves in order to survive in the new environment.1 AP 
feels it has taken a major step in doing so with Gateway.  However, its ability to blaze new 
trails, both for its own vitality and the welfare of its industry, is challenged by the unique 
dynamics of the cooperative structure and the fixed mentality of those who comprise it.  
Owned by newspapers, with 18 of its 19 Board seats occupied by print executives, the AP 
answers to a core that – shaken by industry-wide “creative destruction” – labors to envision 
its own future.  As the AP attempts to innovate, undoing long-held precepts of how a 
newspaper cooperative should function as it does, its initiative is greeted by confusion, 
dissonance…even fear.   
Notions of AP re-shuffling the Board, or more radically, striking out on its own as an 
independent enterprise, must be reconciled against the critical role that newspapers still play 
in funding its $500 million worldwide journalistic operation2 – more than twice the 
newsroom budget of The New York Times.3  This financial backbone, coupled with the 
content contributions of partners across the globe, enables the AP to offer a value proposition 
                                                          
1
 Schumpeter, Joseph A.  Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy.  New York, NY: Harper, 1942.  See also Foster, 
Richard and Sarah Kaplan.  Creative Destruction: Why Some Companies That Are Built to Last Underperform 
the Market – and How to Successfully Transform Them.  New York, NY: Currency Doubleday, 2001. 
2
 Kennedy, Jim.  “Newsgathering.”  Message to Jed Williams.  E-mail.  25 Feb. 2010.  
3
 Calame, Byron.  “The Public Editor: Final Thoughts About My Tenure and The Times’ Future.”  The New York 
Times.  6 May 2007   
<http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/06/opinion/06pubed.html?_r=1&n=Top%2fOpinion%2fThe%20Public%20
Editor>.  “The Times doesn’t dispute the recent intimation by Donald E. Graham, chairman of the Washington 
Post Company, that The Times’s yearly news budget is more than $200 million.” 
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as “the essential global news network.”  Should that newspaper nourishment dissipate, could 
AP find the revenue to sustain such a vast a news-gathering force?4 
The AP finds itself ensnared in a “can’t live with them, can’t live without them” 
dilemma.  Its ambitions stretch beyond the boundaries of its traditional partners, yet its 
business and content engines are still largely driven by the cooperative model.  AP is trying 
to solve this puzzle by re-imagining its market position as an innovator and revenue creator.  
However, it is too early to determine if its members, whose financial support is crucial to 
sustaining AP, see this reinvention as a salvation for them. If the answer is “no,” then AP 
must return to the drawing board yet again, with no guarantees that it can invent itself 
quickly enough and substantially enough to thrive – or even survive – long term in the 21st 
century.  
                                                          
4
 Kennedy, Jim.  Vice President and Director of Strategic Planning, Associated Press.  Personal Interview.  15 
Feb. 2010.  Kennedy states that if the AP were to scrap its business-to-business framework and look to 
compete “in the digital space as a [retail] brand by itself, you’d be lucky to have a $200 million business.”  See 
“Consolidated Financial Statements: The Associated Press and Subsidiaries, Years ended December 31, 2008 
and 2007.”  <http://www.ap.org/annual09/media/APFinancials08.pdf>. By comparison, in 2008, AP produced 
$748 million in revenue.  Kennedy estimates that the number will fall to around $650 million in 2009 and 
2010, though that financial information is yet to be released.   
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Appendix A: Fayetteville’s Associated Press Usage Patterns, 1985-2008 
 
The Fayetteville Observer, a mid-sized daily without the financial resources or local 
staff breadth of a larger metro like Charlotte, depended heavily on the AP to fill out its A 
Section over the course of the sample.306  In recent periods, however, the trend has evinced 
signs of change.  Though the AP remains a staple of The Observer’s A Section, it is less 
omnipresent as in the past.  Still, the wire comprised the lion’s share of section content.  AP 
pieces outnumbered stories from other wire services and locally-reported material by a wide 
margin in all six sample periods.  Of the 665 coded stories, 495 – or 74 percent – were 
accessed from the AP.307  The next closest category was locally-reported material, with a 
total of 102, or 15 percent.308  “You go back to the AP’s strengths, which are speed, general 
tone of the news, voice, and also consistency of style and format,” Broadwell said.  “The AP 
is still a foundation.”   
 Meanwhile, supplemental wire services were largely absent in Fayetteville.  Other 
than 1985, when Fayetteville still subscribed to United Press International (UPI) as a second 
full-service wire provider, the paper made minimal use of any wire content outside of AP.309  
Over the remaining five non-UPI periods, only 30 total non-AP wire stories appeared in 
                                                          
306
 Arbitron.com and NCPress.com, supra note 6.  
307
 Fayetteville’s lowest AP output – 71 stories in 2005 and 2008 – still bested its top local reporting year – 24 
in 1990 – by 47 stories, a nearly three-to-one ratio.       
308
 This breaks down to 13.8 AP stories per coded issue, compared to 2.8 local articles. 
309
 57.7 percent of Fayetteville’s supplemental wire usage, or 41 of 71 total stories, appeared in 1985.   
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Section A,310 primarily from the Los Angeles Times-Washington Post News Service.  
Supplementals such as The New York Times News Service and Knight Ridder barely 
registered.  “It was probably a richer mix [of wire content] in Charlotte,” Broadwell said.  
“Ours was maybe more meat and potatoes.  Sometimes it was as if our Los Angeles Times-
Washington Post News Service was an afterthought that would only get used for features or 
perspective-type pullout pieces.” 
Fayetteville leaned on the AP chiefly for national, then international news.  Output in 
these two categories fluctuated more year-by-year than in Charlotte but remained Section A 
hallmarks.311  AP national news was the most prevalent story type in every single coded year, 
exceeding even the highest locally-generated story count by itself.  International content 
finished second in every sample save one.312  Broadwell is quick to point out that with Fort 
Bragg, home to the 82nd Airborne Division, in its backyard, and its soldiers deployed across 
the globe, Fayetteville is a military community with different local and international needs.  
“Haiti is a local story for us,” he said.  “Iraq, Afghanistan – we’ve paid a lot of attention to it 
on the front page.  Right now we probably have 10,000 soldiers in those areas.”  State news 
came in third, as The Observer looked to the North Carolina wire for a healthy percentage of 
its reports.313  Overall, Fayetteville’s AP usage pie segmented off as follows: 56 percent 
national, 36 percent international and 7 percent state.       
                                                          
310
 In 1990, for example, the sample turned up 107 AP stories to just 3 “other wire” entries.   
311
 Total national news stories varied widely from 30 to 65 annually.  International wire news was slightly more 
consistent, with a yearly range of 21 to 39.   
312
 AP international stories placed third in1985, when all AP state content was lumped into Section A instead 
of partitioned off into the “Local & State” section, which would be formed later. 
313
 This diverged from Charlotte, where almost all state news emanated from local reporters and bureaus, 
especially Section A state reports. 
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 Even as AP maintained dominant presence within Fayetteville’s Section A, its 
relative use retreated.  AP story volume peaked in 1990, dipped in 1995, stabilized until 2005 
and then receded again.  The 107 AP stories that Fayetteville printed in the 1990 sample 
distanced all other years by a minimum of 20 and topped Charlotte’s highest output by 34.  
By 2005, AP coverage slumped by 34 percent.  The 71 AP stories published in both 2005 and 
2008 were 34 percent lower than its 107-story peak in 1990.  Those two periods, 
unsurprisingly, coincided with the two thinnest Section A’s as turbulent economic forces and 
limited content capabilities interlocked.  Fayetteville’s declining Section A AP reliance 
breaks down as follows: 
• AP use peaked at 107 stories (17.8) per issue in 1990. 
• By 1990, total usage was off 25 percent, from 107 to 80 stories. 
• AP volume then flatlined at 71 stories in 2005 and 2008, down 11 percent from 1990 
and 34 percent from 1990.        
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Appendix B: Charlotte’s Associated Press Usage Patterns, 1985-2008 
 
 The Charlotte Observer, the largest daily newspaper delivering to the largest metro 
area in North Carolina,314 also utilized the AP prevalently throughout the sample, but never 
as singularly as Fayetteville.  Content was more balanced across the AP, supplemental wires, 
and local reports.  Of the 707 total stories coded, 45 percent were AP, 38 supplemental, and 
18 percent locally-reported.315  Charlotte’s more even balance lay in stark contrast to 
Fayetteville’s intense dependence on the AP and near non-existent usage of other wires.  This 
disparity underscores two economically-driven dynamics that differentiate the two dailies: 
Charlotte’s deeper editorial budged supported a larger local reporting staff, enabling more in-
house content, and also afforded it access to a wider array of outside news services.   
 Evident in content breakdown, AP was the popular news source, but supplemental 
wires were both prominent and diverse.  Unlike Fayetteville, which drew almost exclusively 
from the Los Angeles Times-Washington Post News Service, Charlotte pulled from The 
New York Times News Service, Bloomberg, and Knight Ridder Wire Service, and later, 
McClatchy-Tribune Information Services, co-owned by its parent company.  Supplementals 
actually exceeded AP content in the first two sample periods, 1985 and 1990.  By 1995, AP 
overtook secondary wires as the principal Section A news provider.  They did not evaporate, 
however, maintaining a consistent 35-40 story range throughout the duration of the sample.   
 Because Charlotte’s Section A state news was generated exclusively in-house, the 
front section included only AP national and international news, at a 57 percent/43 percent 
                                                          
314
 NCPress.com, supra note 4, and Arbitron.com, supra note 5.   
315
 This averaged out at 8.8 AP stories per coded issue, 7.4 supplemental stories, and 3.5 locally-produced 
stories.   
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split.  The yearly story range in these sectors was less volatile than Fayetteville.316  This is 
understandable on two levels.  First, the overall size of Fayetteville’s Section A showed more 
extreme oscillations across the coding timeline than Charlotte’s did.317  Second, Charlotte 
leaned less on the AP, allowing it to safely allot a designated amount of space to the 
cooperative while supplementing it with a balanced ration of news from other wires and local 
reports.  Fayetteville, by contrast, tapped the AP to fill more news holes.  Fluctuation could 
occur as a symptom of both the quantity and nature of the content that the wire sent out at 
any particular moment, as well as the newspaper’s time-sensitive needs. 
 While Charlotte historically relied far less on the AP wire for Section A news content 
than Fayetteville, its usage patterns demonstrated two notable, perhaps anomalous, jumps 
over the past decade.   
• From 1985 through 1995, AP volume stood relatively still.   
• In 2000, AP inventory spiked by 30 percent to 57 stories.  This increase coincided 
with a Presidential election year, as did a second leap in 2008, when AP presence 
surged by 35 percent from 54 to 73 stories, the highest tally of the sample.  2008 
marked the only year in the sample that Charlotte’s AP story usage topped 
Fayetteville’s, 73 to 71.   
                                                          
316
 National stories varied from 27 to 39, while international news fell on a 16-34 story continuum.  These 12-
and-18-story ranges paled in comparison to Fayetteville’s 35-and-18-story ranges.   
317
 Fayetteville’s total story range was 42: 134 in 1985 and 1990, 92 in 2005.  Charlotte’s was 28: 133 in 2008, 
105 in 1995.   
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Even in election years with AP densely populating its pages, Charlotte continued to 
outdistance Fayetteville in supplemental use by a wide margin.318   
  
                                                          
318
 In 2000, Charlotte’s Section A printed 39 supplemental stories to Fayetteville’s 7.  In 2008, the ratio was 39-
to-4. 
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Appendix C: Internet/”Splinternet” Platform Characteristics Chart 
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Appendix D: “Web 2.0 Business Model” 
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